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I. INTRODUCTION
The Coachella Valley, an oasis sitting proudly in the middle of the desert, 
is home to sprawling communities, lush golf courses, businesses, and hotels.1 
The Coachella Valley, like the rest of California, is running out of water.2
 1. Introducing Palm Springs and the Coachella Valley, LONELY PLANET, http://www. 
cc/6PXJ-KQYG] (last visited Nov 9, 2016) (explaining the evolution of the Coachella Valley
into a golf course and hotel-laden valley); Matt Stevens, With Flush Aquifer, Coachella
RP5W-VVYE] (“The Citrus is one of 123 [golf] courses in the Coachella Valley, the world- 
renowned resort destinations that spans 45 miles from Palm Springs to Indio.”); see Visitor’s 
Guide to Coachella, CA, GREATER PALM SPRINGS, http://visitgreaterpalmsprings.com/visit/
explore/our-cities/coachella/ [https://perma.cc/2YFX-4XB9] (last visited Nov. 9, 2016);
see also Coachella Valley, California, CITY-DATA, http://www.city-data.com/city/Coachella- 
Valley-California.html [https://perma.cc/8UJS-UWWR] (last visited Nov. 9, 2016). 
lonelyplanet.com/usa/california/palm-springs-and-coachella-valley/introduction [https://perma.
Valley Golf Courses Slow to Conserve, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2014, 10:00 AM), http://www.
latimes.com/local/california/la-me-adv-golf-water-20141221-story.html [https://perma.cc/
 2. Ian James, Building in the Desert, Counting on Water, DESERT SUN, Aug. 31, 2014,
at A1; Anna R. Schecter & Matthew Deluca, In Palm Springs, America’s ‘Oasis’ Grapples 
with Drought, NBC NEWS (Apr. 7, 2015, 2:24 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/Storyline/ 
california-drought/palm-springs-americas-oasis-grapples-drought-n337371 [https://perma.
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In 2014, environmentalists and locals alike were up in arms against land
development in Coachella, where developers continued planning new 
communities consisting of about ten thousand homes.3  Residents were 
concerned about where the water would come from, as the groundwater 
levels that sustain the Coachella Valley have been declining for decades.4 
The Colorado River replenishes the aquifer in the valley, but the water supply
is not great enough to meet the increasing demand.5  Under California law, 
development agreements for subdivisions of over 500 dwelling units require 
written verification from a public water system that a sufficient water supply 
is available.6 Coachella Valley’s water agencies, however, have not turned 
down any requests to supply water to proposed developments, despite 
California’s state of drought and water shortages felt sharply in the Coachella
cc/UB7X-ETDC] (“Periodic dry spells are nothing new for California, or for Palm Springs,
and city officials say they have been active in recent years to set ambitious goals to cut down 
on water amid a four-year drought.”). 
3. James, supra note 2, at A12 (“One of the largest proposed developments, La
Entrada, would create a new community on 2,000 acres of desert . . . [and] would use a 
projected 5,365 acre-feet of water per year . . . .”).
4. Id. (discussing declining groundwater levels, and resident concerns over the water
agencies’ assumptions about the future); Water-Use Restrictions & Penalties, COACHELLA
VALLEY WATER DIST., http://www.cvwd.org/261/Water-use-Restrictions-Penalties [https://
perma.cc/7VMN-H6FB] (last visited Nov. 9, 2016) (explaining the Coachella Valley Water
District’s goal for a 20% reduction in water by 2020). 
 5. James, supra note 2, at A12 (“And that long-term downward trend [of groundwater
levels]— together with the drought and the dropping levels of reservoirs on the Colorado
River—has led some to ask whether the water agencies’ assumptions about the future [land 
developments] are sound.”); Lisa M. Krieger, ‘A State of Drought’: Coachella Valley Grapples 
with Shrinking Water Supplies, MERCURY NEWS (Oct. 3, 2015, 6:46 AM), http://www.Mercury
news.com/drought/ci_28916909/state-drought-coachella-valley-grapples-shrinking-water-
supplies?source=infinite-up [https://perma.cc/X7VS-GNCZ] (explaining that the population in
Coachella Valley has grown from around 1,000 in the early 1900s to about 500,000 today,
and is expected to continue to rise at a fast rate, and that at least six new major land developments 
have been approved since the drought began four years ago). 
6. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 66455.3 (West 2009) (“[A] tentative map application for a 
proposed subdivision . . . shall [be sent] to any [potential] water supplier . . . .”); CAL. GOV’T 
CODE § 66473.7 (West 2009) (defining “subdivision,” in part, as a “proposed residential
development of more than 500 dwelling units,” and “sufficient water supply,” in part, as “the
total water supplies available during normal, single-dry, and multiple-dry years within a 20-
year projection that will meet the projected demand associated with the proposed subdivision”);
MICHELLE FIRMACION & ELLIS RASKIN, HASTINGS PUB.L. & POL’Y WORK GROUP, CALIFORNIA
LAW AT THE INTERSECTION OF WATER USE AND LAND PLANNING: A REPORT FOR THE
CALIFORNIA OFFICE OF PLANNING AND RESEARCH 1, 19, 57 (2015), http://gov.uchastings.
edu/public-law/docs/water-landuse.pdf [https://perma.cc/T6BS-VDSS]. 
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Valley.7  Coachella’s utilities general manager said that the city places the
burden to locate and ensure that there is water for the development project 
entirely on the developer.8 
The Coachella Valley Water District’s Manager reviewed the water supply 
assessment for the development and advised the city that it would not object
to the La Entrada project, one of the largest proposed developments consisting
of commercial buildings, schools, parks, and 7,800 homes.9 Therefore, there
appears to be a disparity between the mandated residential cutbacks on water 
use, and the approval of continuous development.10 Barton Thompson,
director of Stanford University’s Woods Institute for the Environment, 
argues that developers must consider the available water supply in an area 
before asking to build additional homes.11  Traditionally, cities, not water
 7. James, supra note 2, at A12; see Krieger, supra note 5 (explaining that Coachella
Valley received only twenty percent of its State Water Project allocation in 2015 due to 
the drought, so it supplemented its water supply with water imported from the Yuba River);
Sammy Roth, Desert Banking on FADING RIVER, DESERT SUN, June 7, 2015, at A7
(“While the [Colorado] river is in better shape than Coachella Valley’s fragile aquifer, it 
faces a slow-burning crisis of its own.”).
 8. James, supra note 2, at A12 (“[T]he city’s pending approval of the project hinges on
CVWD’s confirmation that the water district has enough water [from] its imported allotment
from the Colorado River to replace the amounts of water pumped from the aquifer.”); Rosalie 
Murphy & Ian James, Unchecked Growth, Questions About Water, DESERT SUN (Apr. 17, 
2015), http://www.desertsun.com/story/news/environment/2015/04/17/unchecked-growth-
questions-water/25952941/ [https://perma.cc/5HVW-SWJ7] (“[Land] developments of more
than 500 homes are required to seek approval of a water supply assessment, and as part of
the process, developers need to show that there are sufficient water supplies for the next 
20 years.”).
 9. James, supra note 2, at A12.  The Coachella Valley Water District approved plans
for a proposed development that would create another neighborhood with about 2,400 homes, 
shops, offices, and buildings, one of the many proposed developments across the Coachella
Valley.  Ian James, CVWD Oks Plans for Agua Caliente Land Development, DESERT SUN
(Nov. 13, 2014, 5:08 PM), http://www.desertsun.com/story/news/environment/2014/11/13/ 
coachella-valley-water-agua-caliente-development/18999431/ [https://perma.cc/9VPJ-ZE4J]. 
 10. Adam Nagourney, Losing Water, California Tries to Stay Atop Economic Wave, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/20/us/losing-water-california- 
tries-to-stay-atop-economic-wave.html (“The drought that has overrun California—forcing severe
cutbacks in water for farms, homeowners and businesses—has run up against a welcome 
economic resurgence that is sweeping across much of the state after a particularly brutal 
downturn.”); id. (“Water consumption is not necessarily the first concern of local officials
as they approve grand 25-year development plans, with their promises of jobs and tax revenues.”); 
Sammy Roth, California Drought: CVWD Could Increase Penalty Fees, DESERT SUN (Oct. 14,
2015, 10:03 AM), http://www.desertsun.com/story/news/environment/2015/10/13/california-
drought-cvwd-increase-penalty-fees/73878116/ [https://perma.cc/4D9B-8BBQ] (noting that
the Coachella Valley Water district has imposed penalty fines for excessive water use beyond 
the state-mandated 36% reductions in water use). 
 11. James, supra note 2, at A13; see also Adam Nagourney et al., California Drought
Tests History of Endless Growth, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/
04/05/us/california-drought-tests-history-of-endless-growth.html (“Mayor Eric Garcetti 
of Los Angeles, pointing to Mr. Brown’s executive order and his own city’s success in reducing
1058
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agencies, make land use decisions.12  David Feldman, chairman of UC Irvine’s
Department of Planning, Policy and Design, stated that “there needs to be
some statewide guidance, instruction, maybe even limitations on building 
permits somehow linked to dependable water availability.”13  Feldman is
completely correct in this.  The state must take a hands-on approach to this
prevalent problem of granting developments when there is not a sufficient 
water supply that evidently occurs in areas that must not continue developing,
especially when California is suffering a terrible drought.14 
California’s population rapidly expanded in the mid-1900s, so land planners 
began using zoning and general plans to guarantee that future growth would 
fit within a comprehensive plan and not alter the general welfare of an area.15 
Land developers began claiming scarce water resources through “prescription,”
which occurs when a person takes title to another’s property by openly and 
notoriously occupying the property of another for the period of time prescribed 
by law.16  After the California Supreme Court limited prescriptive rights in
several cases, it was evident that there must be one system of water regulation 
among landowners.17  This current trend in California of land development
water consumption, said he was confident that the state would find ways to deal with an era of
reduced water supplies, in a way that would permit it to continue to grow and thrive.”).
 12. James, supra note 2, at A13; see also Housing Element, PALM SPRINGS 2014 – 2021
HOUSING ELEMENT: GENERAL PLAN, at 3–79, http://www.ci.palm-springs.ca.us/home/show
document?id=29351 [https://perma.cc/L97K-2CEB] (“Palm Springs recognizes the finiteness
of its water supply and the importance of conservation.”). 
 13. James, supra note 2, at A13; see Faculty: David L. Feldman, UCI SCHOOL OF SOCIAL
ECOLOGY, https://socialecology.uci.edu/faculty/feldmand [https://perma.cc/ZL9V-Q6WG] (last
updated Nov. 9, 2016). 
14. 2016 Drought Watch, ASS’N OF CAL. WATER AGENCIES, http://www.acwa.com/
content/drought [https://perma.cc/DN7F-QD5E] (last visited Nov. 9, 2016) (“The uneven recovery
and possibility of dry conditions next year means that the drought is not over yet.”). 
15. FIRMACION & RASKIN, supra note 6, at 15; see MARC REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT:
THE AMERICAN WEST AND ITS DISAPPEARING WATER 109 (rev. ed. 1993) (“Even California, in
the midst of a big population boom, saw the growth of its agricultural population come to 
a standstill in 1895 [due to a drought].”); see Mark August Nitikman, Note, Instant Planning-
Land Use Regulation by Initiative in California, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 497, 501–02 (1988)
(discussing the history of California’s zoning laws). 
16. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1007 (West 2007) (“Occupancy for the period prescribed by
the Code of Civil Procedure as sufficient to bar any action for the recovery of the property 
confers a title thereto, denominated a title by prescription . . . .”); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 321 (West 2006) (explaining that title is obtained after five years of open and notorious 
adverse possession).
17. City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 5 P.3d 853, 864 (Cal. 2000) (holding 
that preexisting water users’ priority could not be supplanted by apportioning prescriptive 
rights); People v. Shirokow, 605 P.2d 859, 866 (Cal. 1980) (holding that while prescriptive 
 1059
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in spite of a constantly dwindling water supply is simply unsustainable, and
the state legislature must control water disbursement and management, 
and ultimately land development, to curb water shortages in California.18 
This Comment argues that the California state legislature should take direct
control of private water use rights through legislation that amends California’s 
Constitution Article X, Section 2, providing the state with the police power
to take back private water rights and centralize control over water management 
and distribution.19  It also recommends imposing higher requirements for land
development and water agency cooperation in standard form, state-controlled 
“general plans” to create efficiency in distributing water throughout the state 
and in planning new land developments.  The public trust doctrine, eminent
domain doctrine, and regulatory takings doctrine are possible justifications
the state could use to effectuate the new legislation. 
Part I of this Comment will provide background on the different categories 
of water rights in California, the State Water Resources Control Board
(State Water Board) and major water supply projects, the different groups 
demanding water in California, the history of legislation that arose with
each major drought in California, and land use planning laws. Part II
will argue that the state should take direct control over private water rights 
in California, a concept legally justified by the public trust doctrine, eminent 
domain, and the regulatory use doctrine. Part III will explain the logistics of 
enacting this proposal, including implementing the suggested constitutional 
amendment and improving the “general plans” required before land
development occurs, along with the counterarguments and implications of
the proposal. Part IV will conclude that this power transfer from individuals 
and cities to the state is essential in a state that has inconsistent and failing 
policies with coordinating land development and water supplies, and it is 
especially necessary in this period of drought. 
rights exist, these rights are subordinate to the state’s regulatory authority); FIRMACION &
RASKIN, supra note 6, at 15 (explaining California’s history of suburban sprawl that led to 
adverse possession of water rights); see Nirav K. Desai, Up a Creek: An Introduction to 
the Commission’s Final Report Discussion of Uncertainty in California Water Rights Law, 
36 MCGEORGE L. REV. 29, 39 (2005) (noting that in 1980, the California Conservation
Commission recommended that the state abolish prescriptive rights entirely). 
18. FIRMACION & RASKIN, supra note 6, at 19 (“Although California has taken some 
steps to align land planning with water management, these two areas of regulation remain 
disconnected in many respects.  There are no laws in California that prohibit new 
development where water is not available to support further growth.”). 
19. California’s water management issues would benefit from adding language to
the State’s Constitution in article X, section 2 stating, for example: “The State has the legal
police power to take back all types of private water use rights, including but not limited to 
riparian rights, pre-1914 rights, and appropriated rights, in times of water shortage or at any
time the State determines that water in the State is not being put to beneficial and reasonable 
use.  The State must then centralize control over the water rights, and redistribute the water
in the most beneficial and reasonable way to the local water managers of the State.” 
1060
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II. DOWN TO THE LAST DROP—HOW WATER HAS BEEN POSSESSED,
 
MANAGED, AND DISTRIBUTED IN CALIFORNIA OVER TIME
 
A. The Evolution of Water Rights 
In California, the water supply is subject to the overarching constitutional 
limitation that water use must be reasonable.20  The “reasonable use” standard 
is as follows:
All water flowing in any natural channel, excepting so far as it has been or is being 
applied to useful and beneficial purposes upon, or in so far as it is or may be
reasonably needed for useful and beneficial purposes upon lands riparian thereto, 
or otherwise appropriated, is hereby declared to be public water of the State and 
subject to appropriation in accordance with the provisions of this code.21 
Due to the conditions in California, the general welfare requires that water 
use be limited to “reasonable and beneficial use,” where a “riparian” water
right “entitles the landowner to use a correlative share of the water flowing
past his or her property.”22 Where riparians’ water rights were historically 
only limited by other riparians using the same stream and appropriators were
limited to reasonable use, California enacted a constitutional amendment
subjecting both riparians and appropriators to the limitation of reasonable 
20. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2; see  CRAIG M. WILSON, CAL. WATER BDS., THE 
REASONABLE USE DOCTRINE & AGRICULTURAL WATER USE EFFICIENCY 1, 3 (2011), 
http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/board_info/agendas/2011/jan/011911_12_reasonableuse
doctrine_v010611.pdf [https://perma.cc/T32T-NW4S] (“The Reasonable and Beneficial Use
Doctrine (Reasonable Use Doctrine) is the cornerstone of California’s complex water rights
laws. . . . The underlying premise of this report is that the inefficient use of water is an
unreasonable use of water.”). 
21. CAL. WATER CODE § 1201 (West 2009); compare CAL. WATER CODE § 102 (West
2009) (“All water within the State is property of the people of the State, but the right to
the use of water may be acquired by appropriation in the manner provided by law.”), with
COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 6 (“The right to divert unappropriated waters of any natural
stream to beneficial uses shall never be denied.”).
22. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2; CAL. WATER CODE § 100 (West 2009); The Water Rights
Process, STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD., http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/waterrights/
board_info/water_rights_process.shtml [https://perma.cc/9X2M-P99K ] (last visited
Nov. 9, 2016) [hereinafter Water Rights Process] (“Riparian rights do not require permits, 
licenses, or government approval, but they apply only to the water which would naturally
flow in the stream.”); see CALIFORNIA’S WATER: AN LAO PRIMER, LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S 
OFFICE (2008), http://www.lao.ca.gov/2008/rsrc/water_primer/water_primer_102208.aspx#
chapter1 [https://perma.cc/93JR-NYMB] (stating that the “reasonable use” requirement must
be reformed, because the constitution-mandated implementation has “counter-productive 
results” where it has been implemented as a “use it or lose it” policy, leading to water overuse,
and inefficient, continued water use). 
1061
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use of water.23 This constitutional amendment has become the golden rule
in California.24 
California law divides water into several categories, including surface water,
percolating groundwater, and subterranean streams flowing through known 
and definite channels.25 California water law also distinguishes between several
categories of water rights holders depending on how the water right was 
obtained.26 
1. Groundwater Rights 
To obtain groundwater rights, one can extract the water and use it for a 
beneficial purpose, unless it is water in a subterranean stream flowing in
known and definite channels.27  An entity or individual has an “overlying 
groundwater right” when it uses water on land over the groundwater basin
from which the water comes.28  An “appropriative groundwater right” occurs
when the individual or entity takes the water from another place, where
 23. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2; see Peabody v. City of Vallejo, 40 P.2d 486, 498–99 
(Cal. 1935) (finding that the constitutional limitation applies “to all water rights enjoyed 
or asserted in this state, whether the same be grounded on the riparian right or . . . the 
appropriative right”); United States v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 227 Cal. Rptr. 161, 170 
(Ct. App. 1986) (“Historically, appropriators, but not riparians, were limited to reasonable 
and beneficial uses of the water; riparians were subject only to the needs of other riparians 
on the same stream, frequently with wasteful results.”).
24. WATER § 100 (“[B]ecause of the conditions prevailing in this State the general 
welfare requires that the water resources of the State be put to beneficial use to the fullest 
extent of which they are capable.”); see State Water Res. Control Bd., 227 Cal. Rptr. at 171 
(“This ‘rule of reasonable use’ is now the cardinal principle of California’s water law.”).
25. CAL. WATER CODE § 1200 (West 2009); Jan Stevens, California’s Groundwater: A
Legally Neglected Resource, 19 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 3, 7 (2013) 
(“California law sets forth three categories for water: surface water, percolating groundwater,
and subterranean streams flowing through known and definite channels.”).
26. Water Rights Process, supra note 22 (explaining that water right law in California
developed into two general divisions of rights: riparian rights, which come with owning a 
parcel of land adjacent to a source of water, and appropriative rights, which began when
fortune-seeking miners came to California and claimed water rights by “posting notice”).
Notably, a permit process governs this system today. Id.
 27. Water Rights, STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD., http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/ 
waterrights/board_info/faqs.shtml [https://perma.cc/3C9V-R4ZF] (last visited Nov. 9, 2016)
[hereinafter Water Rights]; Waste Management Inc., Dec. 1645 (Cal. State Water Res. 
Control Bd. Oct. 17, 2002), http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/waterrights/board_decisions/adopted_
orders/decisions/d1600_d1649/wrd1645.pdf [https://perma.cc/3HEC-XJN9]. 
28. Water Rights, supra note 27.  For a discussion of depleted groundwater basins 
in California and the accompanying consequences, see Matt Stevens, 21 California Groundwater 
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overlying rights have higher priority than appropriative rights.29  Today,
appropriators must obtain permits for water rights.30  The State Water Board
can only issue groundwater diversions from subterranean streams, and the 
state can stop wasteful or unreasonable uses of groundwater or groundwater 
diversions that harm state resources.31 
2. Surface Water Rights 
California recognizes several different types of rights to use surface water.32 
Water rights holders include riparians, appropriators, and permittees and
licensees under the State Water Board’s jurisdiction.33  Individuals hold
some rights, such as riparian, appropriated, and permitted rights, while the
government exclusively holds other rights, such as pueblo rights.34  California
 29. Water Rights, supra note 27; see also Miller & Lux, Inc. v. Enter. Canal & Land 
Co., 147 P. 567, 570 (Cal. 1915) (holding that the plaintiff company could not sustain a 
claim of a prescriptive right against a defendant company that had riparian land, and thus 
riparian water rights, situated above the point of the plaintiff’s diversion into their water source).
30. Water Rights Process, supra note 22 (“The [Water Commission] Act created
the agency that later evolved into the State Board and granted it the authority to administer 
permits and licenses for California’s surface water.”). 
31. Water Rights, supra note 27.  For more information on groundwater rights, see 
Gregory S. Weber, Forging a More Coherent Groundwater Policy in California: State 
and Federal Constitutional Law Challenges to Local Groundwater Export Restrictions, 
34 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 373, 374 (1994) (“[This article] explores in detail an important 
question left largely unexplored in earlier work: the authority of local governments, under the
state and federal constitutions, to restrict groundwater exports.”).
 32. Bettina Boxall, Lawsuits Over California Water Rights Are a Fight a Century in the
Making, L.A.TIMES (June 29, 2015, 4:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-
water-rights-legal-20150629-story.html [https://perma.cc/XW28-QYFW] (describing how in
California, most rights to surface water are based on the idea of “first in time, first in right,”
where the priority lies with users who first diverted and used the resource).  The most senior
water rights predate 1914, the beginning of the permit system.  Id.
33. Brian E. Gray, Fragmented Regulation of Multiple Stressors: A Cautionary Tale
for Takings Law, 19 HASTINGS W.-N.W. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 341, 346 (2013) (“The water 
rights of these users run the gamut of California surface water rights law, including riparians,
pre-1914 appropriators, and permitees and licensees subject to the SWRCB’s direct regulatory
jurisdiction.”). For more explanation of the State Water Board’s jurisdiction, see Ruth 
Langridge, Drought and Groundwater: Legal Hurdles to Establishing Groundwater Drought 
Reserves in California, 36 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 91, 103 (2012) (examining
whether the “recent re-articulation of the test for a ‘subterranean stream’ include[s] water 
previously not under the jurisdiction of the SWRCB in the determination of surface water
rights”).
34. Water Rights, supra note 27; see Eric B. Kunkel, The Spanish Law of Waters in
the United States: From Alfonso the Wise to the Present Day, 32 MCGEORGE L. REV. 341, 
353–56 (2001) (discussing the development of the pueblo water rights doctrine in California
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water law also distinguishes between senior water rights holders and junior 
water rights holders.35 
Generally, riparians are landowners who have the right to divert and use 
the water flowing near the riparians’ land, as opposed to appropriators who 
must obtain permits for water rights.36  Riparian water rights exist when a
landowner is entitled to use water that naturally flows next to or on his land, 
but such use must be reasonable and for beneficial purposes.37  The aftermath 
of the drought has proved riparian water rights, which are senior rights, to 
not be as secure as riparians believed.38 
Pueblo water rights are senior water rights held by municipalities that 
can trace their origin back to a Spanish or Mexican pueblo and have seniority 
over natural waterways and connected groundwater basins within their
through case law); see, e.g., Lux v. Haggin, 10 P. 674, 715 (Cal. 1886) (“[W]e hold the 
pueblos had a species of property in the flowing waters within their limits, or ‘a certain 
right or title’ in their use, in trust to be distributed to the common lands . . . .”).
35. Water Rights Process, supra note 22 (explaining that after 1914, appropriative 
rights are governed by the hierarchy of priorities developed by gold miners in California); 
id. (“In times of shortage the most recent (‘junior’) right holder must be the first to
discontinue such use; each right’s priority dates to the time the permit application was filed 
with the State Board.”); see Fact Sheet, CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.swrcb 
.ca.gov/waterrights/water_issues/programs/drought/docs/tucp/curtailment_fact_sheet.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/B2WP-SWEE] (last updated Nov. 9, 2015) (explaining that the most
junior water right holders are curtailed before restrictions are placed on senior water right 
holders).
36. Water Rights Process, supra note 22 (noting that riparian rights entitle “the
landowner to use a correlative share of the water flowing past his or her property” and do
not require government issued permits); see Miller & Lux, Inc. v. Enter. Canal & Land
Co., 147 P. 567, 570 (Cal. 1915) (“Under the established law of riparian rights, a title by
prescription cannot be acquired against a tract of riparian land by diverting the water from 
the stream at a point below such land, and not interfering with the stream at the riparian 
land.”).
37. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2 (“Riparian rights in a stream or water course attach to, 
but to no more than so much the flow thereof as may be required or used consistently with
this section, for the purposes for which such lands are, or may be made adaptable, in view
of such reasonable and beneficial uses.”).  For an example of rules under common law 
riparianism in eastern states, see City of Canton v. Shock, 63 N.E. 600, 603 (Ohio 1902),
which held that water “cannot be lawfully diverted or transported” from its original source.
Riparian rights are common in eastern states.  See Robert W. Adler, Climate Change and the
Hegemony of State Water Law, 29 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 17 (2010) (“The riparian rights 
system applied in most eastern states, in which all owners of riparian property have
the right to reasonable use of water, evolved under conditions of relatively plentiful water 
supplies, although the modified administrative version of riparian rights now in place in
most of the East has increasingly had to address water shortages and related conflicts among 
municipal and other users.”). 
38. Diane Kindermann Henderson, The Language of Water: California’s Water 
Lexicon Expands, 56 ORANGE COUNTY LAW. 10, 14 (2014) (noting that senior water rights
are “generally . . . superior” but do not guarantee water, and while possibly unpopular, senior
water rights can be curtailed to prevent unreasonable use of the state’s water supplies). 
1064
KAVOUNAS2 (DO NOT DELETE) 10/25/2018 1:07 PM      
  
    
 
 














   
   





    
 




    
   
    
 
   
  
  
     
    
[VOL. 53: 1055, 2016]	 California’s Curse 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
municipal boundaries.39  However, pueblo rights do not extend to groundwater 
basins that are not connected to surface waters within the municipal boundaries 
of the pueblo.40 
The last category of senior water rights holders is pre-1914 appropriators.
In California prior to 1914, water rights holders simply took control of 
water and used however much they wanted.41  The Water Commission Act
of 1914 established the permit process that allows for the appropriation of
unappropriated state water.42  The State Water Board has the jurisdiction 
over unlicensed pre-1914 appropriators and can rule on the reasonableness of
their irrigation practices.43  Junior water rights, which are water rights that
 39. See Ronald B. Robie, Effective Implementation of the Public Trust Doctrine in
California Water Resources Decision-Making: A View From the Bench, 45 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1155, 1162 (2012) (“It is true that the Board’s authority over water rights is
somewhat limited because its permitting and licensing authority extends only to
appropriative water rights acquired since 1914 and does not encompass riparian or pueblo
rights at all.” (citing Cal. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 247 P.3d 
112, 117–18 (Cal. 2011))); see also Vernon Irrigation Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 39 P. 
762, 763 (Cal. 1895) (noting that pueblo water rights gave the pueblo “the power to distribute 
the water for the benefit of all the lands . . . claimed by the pueblo”). 
40.  City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 537 P.2d 1250, 1261 (Cal. 1975)
(“The pueblo right has been held to attach to the water needs of inhabitants of areas
annexed to the city rather than being confined to the needs of inhabitants of the original
pueblo.” (citing City of Los Angeles v. Pomeroy, 57 P. 585, 603 (Cal. 1899))); Pueblo 
Water Rights, WATER EDUC. FOUND., http://www.watereducation.org/aquapedia/pueblo-
water-rights [https://perma.cc/V5DJ-2X2B] (last visited Nov. 9, 2016) (“Water use under
a pueblo right must occur within the modern city limits, and excess water may not be sold 
outside the city.”). 
41. Water Rights Process, supra note 22 (noting that up until The Water Commission
Act of 1914, water appropriators, mostly miners and nonriparian farmers, took control of 
and used however much water they wanted).
42. Temescal Water Co. v. Dep’t of Pub. Works, 280 P.2d 1, 11 (Cal. 1955) (“A permit 
itself confers no appropriative rights but fixes the priority of its recipient over subsequent
appropriators; it expressly provides that its issuance is subject to vested rights.” (citing
CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1450–1456 (West 2009))); Bloss v. Rahilly, 104 P.2d 1049, 1051 
(Cal. 1940) (“The main purpose of [the Water Commission Act] was to provide an orderly
method for the appropriation of the unappropriated waters of the state and, to that end, a 
state water commission was created and was vested with certain powers.”); see Water 
Rights Process, supra note 22 (“The Water Commission Act of 1914 established today’s 
permit process.  The Act created the agency that later evolved into the State Board and granted 
it the authority to administer permits and licenses for California’s surface water.”).
43. Imperial Irrigation Dist. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 275 Cal. Rptr. 250, 267 
(Ct. App. 1990) (affirming the State Water Board’s decision regarding Imperial Irrigation
District’s misuses of water, and an order requiring action be taken); see United States v.
State Water Res. Control Bd., 227 Cal. Rptr. 161, 201 (Ct. App. 1986) (“The Board’s obligation 
when setting such [water quality] standards is to ‘establish such water quality objectives . . . as
1065











    
    
  
      
  
 
     
    
 
      
   
    
 
    
    
 




   
   
       
 
   
   
 
  
      
  
     
  
 
have been appropriated after pre-1914 senior water rights holders already
claimed their rights, are traditionally curtailed before senior water rights 
because water rights are prioritized depending on when the rights were
obtained.44  Following this logic, riparians have greater priority over
appropriators.45 
Senior water rights holders exemplify one group that stands in the way
of state control of water use and management.46  All of the senior water rights 
holders, including riparians, pueblo water rights holders, and pre-1914
appropriators, are exempt from the fees charged to all appropriators of surface
water that operate under permit or license issued by the State Water Board.47 
The Sacramento County Superior Court found that the 2003 annual fees only 
covered about sixty-two percent of surface water rights holders because
riparians, pueblo water rights holders, and pre-1914 appropriators were 
statutorily exempt from the fees.48 This means that these three groups include
about thirty-eight percent of water rights holders.49  This is a large number 
that could be allocated back to state control.
in its judgment will ensure the reasonable protection of beneficial uses . . . .’” (quoting CAL.
WATER CODE § 13241 (West 2009))). 
44. See Julia Lurie, California Has Cut Water to Some Farmers. What Exactly Does That
Mean?, MOTHER JONES (May 22, 2015, 5:14 PM), http://www.motherjones.com/environment/ 
2015/05/breaking-california-cutting-water-to-farms [https://perma.cc/T6AQ-NQSM] (discussing
the distinction between senior and junior water rights, water cuts in California in early 2015, as
well as the yearly use of some of California’s top crops); see Water Rights Process, supra note 22.
 45. Water Rights Process, supra note 22 (“Riparian rights still have a higher priority
than appropriative rights.”).
46. Brian Gray et al., Paying for Water in California: The Legal Framework, 65
HASTINGS L.J. 1603, 1619 (2014) (noting that riparians, pre-1914 appropriators, and pueblo 
water right holders are exempt from paying the fees charged to appropriators of surface
water who obtained a permit issued by the State Water Board, and the fees were subsequently
found unconstitutional because the senior water rights holders were exempted). 
47. CAL. WATER CODE § 1525(a) (West 2009) (“[E]ach person or entity who holds 
a permit or license to appropriate water, and each lessor of water leased under Chapter 1.5 
(commencing with Section 1020) of Part 1, shall pay an annual fee according to a fee
schedule established by the [State Water] board.”); Gray et al., supra note 46, at 1619. 
 48. Kurtis Alexander, Just Like City Folk, Water Rights Holders Will Have To 
Track Usage, S.F. CHRON. (Jan. 19, 2016, 8:45 PM), http://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea 
/article/Just-like-city-folk-water-rights-holders-may-6769950.php [https://perma.cc/2PRV-
MCAZ] (“Acknowledging they can’t manage what they can’t measure, regulators in
Sacramento passed rules to require holders of longtime water rights to track and report 
what they draw from rivers and creeks.”); Gray et al., supra note 46, at 1619; Water Rights, 
supra note 27 (“If you have a pre-1914 [appropriative] right, you do not need a water right 
permit unless you have increased your use of water since 1914.”).
49. Gray et al., supra note 46, at 1619.  Interestingly, while senior water rights holders 
were traditionally exempt from fees, they are now currently being managed in other ways, 
with senior water rights being reduced or cut all together. Kurtis Alexander, California 
Tells Senior Water Rights Holders to Stop Pumping, S.F. GATE (June 12, 2015, 9:03 PM),
http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/California-to-senior-water-rights-holders-Stop-6324 
124.php [https://perma.cc/38MJ-KUTK] (“California farmers, irrigation districts and even
1066
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If water rights are not inherent in owning land near a water source, as is 
the case for riparians and pueblo water rights holders, groups can obtain
water rights via the permit system.50  Under California law, the State Water
Board allows unappropriated water to be appropriated for beneficial purposes 
that will best develop, conserve, and use the water in the public interest.51 
The State Water Board approves applications for permits for appropriated 
water.52  The State Water Project (SWP), for example, has appropriative
water rights obtained via a permit issued in 1967.53  Therefore, the state is 
essentially in charge of unappropriated water and approving permit applications
to use the remaining water.54  The state permit process “continues in effect
a few small communities that hold some of the strongest rights to water from rivers and 
streams were ordered Friday to stop pumping, one of the most far-reaching efforts by the
state to protect diminishing supplies amid the four-year drought.”). 
50. CAL. WATER CODE § 1253 (West 2009) (“The board shall allow the appropriation
for beneficial purposes of unappropriated water . . . as in its judgment will best develop, 
conserve, and utilize in the public interest the water sought to be appropriated.”); Water 
Rights Process, supra note 22 (“The Water Commission Act of 1914 established today’s 
permit process.”); id. (“The act was the predecessor to today’s water Code provisions 
governing appropriation.”).  For a discussion of the curtailment process and how growers 
who typically rely on surface water have increasingly relied on groundwater, see Lauren
Maria Alexander, Drought Forcing California Growers to Rely on Groundwater, GROWING 
PRODUCE (Oct. 31, 2014), http://www.growingproduce.com/vegetables/drought-forcing-
california-growers-to-rely-on-groundwater/2/ [https://perma.cc/C4KT-JQ7B] (“While 
sifting through the red tape associated with water rights may be a task better suited for a 
lawyer, there are other factors at play here that are more within your control [as a grower],
and a heightened awareness of groundwater use is one of them.”).
51. WATER § 1253 (“The board shall allow the appropriation for beneficial purposes 
of unappropriated water . . . as in its judgment will best develop, conserve, and utilize in 
the public interest the water sought to be appropriated.”). 
52. CAL. WATER CODE § 1252 (West 2009) (“Any person may apply for and secure
from the board . . . a permit for any unappropriated water.”); see Lawrence J. MacDonnell 
& Teresa A. Rice, Moving Agricultural Water to Cities: The Search for Smarter Approaches, 
14 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 105, 138 (2008) (describing another function 
of the State Water Board, which is to evaluate applications for short-term, temporary changes 
in the “point of diversion, place of use, or purpose of use” of water). 
53. United States v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 227 Cal. Rptr. 161, 167, 169 (Ct. 
App. 1986) (noting that the California Department of Water Resources obtained appropriative 
rights to operate the State Water Project, and the State Water Board issued the permits to 
do so in 1967). 
54. WATER § 1253; State Water Res. Control Bd., 227 Cal. Rptr. at 201 (“Once the
state has approved an appropriation, the public trust imposes a duty of continuing supervision 
over the taking and use of the appropriated water.” (citation omitted)); see Roderick E. 
Walston, California Water Law: Historical Origins to the Present, 29 WHITTIER L. REV. 
765, 778 (2008) (“The State of California has created a parallel water project [to the federal 
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the priority of right as of the date of the application and gives the right to
take and use the amount of water specified in the permit until the issuance 
of a license for the use of the water or until the permit is revoked.”55 
Appropriators’ water rights are therefore limited by priorities in time, meaning
their rights are subordinate to the rights of riparians and senior appropriators,
who were preexisting water rights holders.56  If water use must be reduced 
in the state, junior water rights holders must cut back first before senior
water rights holders have to reduce their usage at all.57  Appropriators and
other users have a harder time acquiring water because appropriators must 
go through a stringent and expensive permit process to gain water use rights, 
and would benefit from sharing the wealth of riparians’ easy access to water 
rights.58  The State Water Board must determine if surplus water is available
before a group is granted a water right permit, and this permit does not affect
previous permits held by riparians and senior appropriators.59  This system
Central Valley Project]—the State Water Project—that similarly redistributes much of the 
state’s water supply.” (citing State Water Res. Control Bd., 227 Cal. Rptr. At 167)). 
55. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1252, 1455 (West 2009); State Water Res. Control Bd.,
227 Cal. Rptr. at 169 (“If the permit holder or license holder violates any of the terms or
conditions or fails to apply the water to a beneficial purpose, the Board may revoke the
permit or license.” (citing CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1410, 1611 (West 2009))).  Notably, most 
of the State Water Board’s decisions are regarding permit applications.  Gregory A. Thomas, 
Conserving Aquatic Biodiversity: A Critical Comparison of Legal Tools for Augmenting 
Streamflows in California, 15 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 26 n.115 (“The Board . . . may ultimately
revoke a permit if the holder violates the permit conditions or does not use the water for
beneficial purposes.” (citations omitted)).
56. State Water Res. Control Bd., 227 Cal. Rptr. at 170; see Statutory Water Rights 
Law, CAL. WATER BDS. 1, xvii (Jan. 2016), http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/laws_regulations/docs/
wrlaws.pdf [https://perma.cc/KS53-HZRD] (“When the Board issues a permit based on a 
state filed application the Board cannot impose a permit term designed to prevent diversion 
when natural flows are insufficient to meet water quality objectives . . . .” (citing El Dorado 
Irrigation Dist. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 468 (Ct. App. 2006))). 
57. State Water Res. Control Bd., 227 Cal. Rptr. at 170; see Statutory Water Rights 
Law, supra note 56, at xviii (“Forfeiture of a senior water right does not necessarily make 
unappropriated water available, because junior appropriators may be able to make use of
the forfeited water, during periods when there otherwise would not have been sufficient 
water available to fully satisfy those junior rights.” (citing North Kern Water Storage Dist.
v. Kern Delta Water Dist., 54 Cal. Rptr. 3d 578 (Ct. App. 2007))). 
58. Water Rights Process, supra note 22 (explaining that a prospective appropriator 
of water must follow several steps in order to be eligible for appropriating water, including
filing an application, acceptance of the application, environmental review, public notice
of the applicant’s intent, protest resolution, and permit issuance); see also Andrea B. Carroll,
Examining a Comparative Law Myth: Two Hundred Years of Riparian Misconception, 80
TUL. L. REV. 901, 904 (2006) (discussing whether riparian landowners on a nonnavigable 
lake have “mutual rights” to the lake’s surface for “nonconsumptive” and recreational
purposes).
59. Temescal Water Co. v. Dep’t. Pub. Works, 280 P.2d 1, 11 (Cal. 1955) (noting
that a permit does not confer an appropriative right, but establishes the priority of the permit
holder over subsequent permit holders, and is still subject to prior vested water rights); 
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does not seem beneficial to a state like California, which has different levels
of need for water across the state.60 
B. The State Water Resources Control Board and Major 

Water Supply Projects 

The State Water Board was created by the Legislature in 1967 and aims
to ensure high water quality for the state as well as allocate water to
“achieve the optimum balance of beneficial uses.”61  Five members appointed 
to four-year terms by the Governor and confirmed by the Senate run the
State Water Board.62  There are also nine Regional Water Quality Control
Boards, called Regional Boards, that “develop and enforce water quality
Duckworth v. Watsonville Water & Light, Co., 150 P. 58, 60 (Cal. 1915) (“It has long
been settled in this state that an appropriation under the code divests no existing private
right, that its effect is merely to give preference over a subsequent appropriator . . . .”
(citations omitted)).  For a discussion of water use permits and the potential impacts of
permits on the public trust, see Michelle Bryan Mudd, Hitching Our Wagon to a Dim Star:
Why Outmoded Water Codes and “Public Interest” Review Cannot Protect the Public 
Trust in Western Water Law, 32 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 283, 299 (2013) (“Under this authority,
the State Water Resources Control Board (SWRCB) can ‘impose further limitations on the 
diversion and use of water by the permitee in order to protect public trust uses.’” (citation
omitted)).
60. See Jeffrey Mount et al., Water Use in California, PUB. POL’Y INST. OF CAL. (2014), 
http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/jtf/JTF_WaterUseJTF.pdf [https://perma.cc/A6KX-BT56]
(explaining that as of July 2014, average water use was roughly fifty percent environmental, forty
percent agricultural, and ten percent urban, and the percentage varies depending on the amount 
of rainfall each year).  Interestingly, environmental water use includes water in rivers that are 
protected as “wild and scenic,” and occurs in rivers along California’s northern coast. Id.
Agricultural use represents about eighty percent of all human water use.  Id.
 61. Water Board’s Structure, CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/ 
about_us/water_boards_structure/index.shtml [https://perma.cc/X9F8-QDEU] (last updated
July 5, 2012).  For a discussion of the current state of California’s water conservation rates,
along with the State Water Board’s oversight of these mandated cuts, see Matt Stevens, 
California Cut Water Use 18.3% in December, Still Barely Meeting Gov. Brown’s Mandate, 
L.A. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2016, 10:59 AM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-water- 
conservation-20160202-story.html [https://perma.cc/LJY4-UKJP] (“As state water regulators
consider extending drought restrictions through [sic] the fall, officials reported Tuesday that
urban Californians had reduced their water use by 18.3% during December.”).
62. See Water Board’s Structure, supra note 61 (“The mission of the Regional Boards 
is to develop and enforce water quality objectives and implementation plans that will best
protect the beneficial uses of the State’s waters.”).  Interestingly, Colorado has a similar
government agency called the Colorado Division of Water Resources that “administers water 
rights, issues water well permits, represents Colorado in interstate water compact proceedings,” 
and more. Colorado Division of Water Resources, Dep’t of Nat. Res., http://water.state.co.us/
Home/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/3PLT-8BUM] (last visited Nov. 9, 2016). 
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objectives and implementation plans” that best secure beneficial use of the
state’s water, while also taking local differences into account—including
climate, topography, geology, and hydrology.63  Both the State Water Board 
and nine Regional Water Quality Control Boards were created by and are 
controlled by the state legislature, and focus on protecting and enforcing
beneficial water use.64 
The State Water Board “shall allow the appropriation for beneficial
purposes of unappropriated water under such terms and conditions as in 
its judgment will best develop, conserve, and utilize in the public interest 
the water sought to be appropriated.”65  To determine whether to appropriate
water, the State Water Board must consider the relative benefit from all
beneficial uses of the water and the reuse or reclamation of such water.66 
Therefore, the State Water Board controls whether permits are issued to 
appropriators and must take into account the reasonable use standard in 
California’s constitution.67 
California provides its water supply through local agencies like municipal 
water systems and special districts, and many areas depend on imported 
63. Water Board’s Structure, supra note 61.  See Walt Kelly, California Water Today, 
PUB. POL’Y INST. OF CAL. 71, 72, http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_211EHChapter
2R.pdf [https://perma.cc/F39A-8XSS] (discussing regional average annual water availability, 
storage, and use, for an example of the differences in hydrology across California); id. at 
75 (discussing the water availability and net water use across the state); id. at 81 (discussing
California’s system of water conveyance and storage as controlled by differed agencies).
64. See Water Board’s Structure, supra note 61; see also Bettina Boxall et al., State 
Water Board Issues Revised Drought Regulations for Californians, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 18, 
2015, 5:55 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-drought-regulations-20150419-
story.html [https://perma.cc/4PJP-8ZKJ] (“‘We’re going to be up-to-our-eyeballs engaged 
with these agencies to see how their doing,’ stated Felicia Marcus of the State Water Resources
Control Board.”); id. (stating that the State Water Board issued a new proposal that enabled 
the regulators to impose more outdoor watering restrictions, change water rates, and fine 
agencies for noncompliance); id. (suggesting that the proposal evidences the Board’s vast 
regulatory power). 
65. CAL. WATER CODE § 1253 (West 2009).
66. See CAL. WATER CODE § 1257 (West 2009) (“The board may subject such
appropriations to such terms and conditions as in its judgment will best develop, conserve, 
and utilize in the public interest, the water sought to be appropriated.”); CAL. WATER CODE
§ 275 (West 2009) (“The department and board shall take all appropriate proceedings or 
actions before executive, legislative, or judicial agencies to prevent waste, unreasonable use,
unreasonable method of use, or unreasonable method of diversion of water in this state.”). 
67. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2; see Paul M. Bartkiewicz et al., A Summary of the California 
Law of Surface Water and Groundwater Rights, N. CAL. WATER ASS’N (2016), http://www.
norcalwater.org/wp-content/uploads/bks_water_rights.pdf [https://perma.cc/QFL9-YSXU]
(stating that California Water Code section 275 authorizes the Department of Water Resources 
and the State Water Board to take all appropriate proceedings to prevent waste on unreasonable 
use or diversion, method of use, or diversions before executive, legislative, or judicial agencies).
1070
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water supplies from the State Water Project (SWP).68 The State of California
controls the reliability of the SWP, created in 1959, which is effective but
lacks influence over entities that have control of their own water supply.69 
The state and federal governments provide water through the SWP and the 
Central Valley Project (CVP) respectively.70  The SWP is the nation’s largest
state-built water and power development and conveyance system, which
collects, stores, and pumps water to twenty-nine water agencies.71  The Project 
is highly developed and intricate, and has cost billions of dollars to build
and operate.72  The federal CVP coexists with California’s state-run State
Water Project; both projects are “managed pursuant to a Coordinated Operating
Agreement,” and both projects are governed by State Water Board issued 
water rights permits and by “biological opinions” from two separate federal
agencies.73 The CVP is operated by the United States Bureau of Reclamation, 
68. See CAL. WATER CODE §§ 12930–12944 (West 2009).  For a detailed discussion 
of how water travels through delivery systems in California to reach its citizens, see California
State Water Project Today, DEP’T OF WATER RES., http://www.water.ca.gov/swp/swp
today.cfm [https://perma.cc/2AV5-BBJ7] (last modified July 18, 2008) (“[The SWP] includes 
facilities—pumping and power plants; reservoirs, lakes, and storage tanks; and canals, tunnels 
and pipelines—that capture, store, and convey water to 29 agencies.”).
69. See WATER §§ 12930–12944; see Richard Rapaport, Comment, Crisis at Kesterson:
A Review of San Joaquin Valley Agricultural Drainage Problems and Possible Solutions, 
5 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 187, 190 n.11 (1986) (“Passage of the Burns-Porter Act in 1960
(Cal. Water Code §§ 12930-12944.5), which authorized the State Water Project, called for 
the Department of Water Resources (DWR) to jointly build a master drain with BUREC.”). 
70. See Gray et al., supra note 46, at 1606 (“The state and federal governments provide
water on a large scale through the State Water Project and Central Valley Project, and also
build and maintain various flood works.”).  For a description of the Central Valley Project, 
see California State Water Project and the Central Valley Project, DEP’T OF WATER RES.,
http://www.water.ca.gov/swp/cvp.cfm [https://perma.cc/3JBD-JB6K] (last modified Apr. 
29, 2008) (“Today the Central Valley Project, operated by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation,
is one of the world’s largest water storage and transport systems.”).
71. See California State Water Project Today, supra note 68 (“By the end of 2001, 
about $5.2 billion had been spent to construct SWP facilities.”). 
72. See The State Water Project, STATE WATER CONTRACTORS, http://www.swc.org/ 
issues/state-water-project/history-of-the-state-water-project [https://perma.cc/6LPV-
SRS6] (last visited Nov. 9, 2016) (stating that water from the project serves more than 
two-thirds of California’s residents, irrigates more than 750,000 acres of farmland, and directly
sustains $400 billion of the statewide economy); see also California State Water Project 
Milestones, DEP’T OF WATER RES., http://www.water.ca.gov/swp/milestones.cfm [https://perma. 
cc/28U4-866A] (last modified Apr. 29, 2008) (stating that in 1960, California voters approved
$1.75 billion in general obligation bonds to finance construction of the State Water Project).
73. See Gray, supra note 33, at 346 (“The major Delta exporters, the Central Valley
Project (CVP) and State Water Project (SWP), are owned by two sovereign governments, 
managed pursuant to a Coordinated Operating Agreement, and governed both by water rights
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and is another large water storage and transport system.74  The SWP supplies
water to “two-thirds of the state’s population,” which includes people who 
use it for drinking water and “farmers who use it to irrigate 75,000 acres 
of cropland.”75 
The SWP was largely a state effort, paid for through the sale of bonds and 
funds from the California Water Fund, as well as regional agencies.76  Now,
states like Colorado that seek to emulate the SWP for solutions to their own
water problems cannot receive sufficient assistance from the federal government 
because the Bureau of Reclamation and Army Corps of Engineers lack the
budgets or mandates for such projects.77  California should take advantage 
of the unique opportunity it has to regulate and manage the state’s water 
supply with the SWP. 
permits issued by the State Water Resources Control Board (SWRCB) and by biological 
opinions from two separate federal agencies.”); see also Central Valley Project, WATER
EDUC. FOUND., http://www.watereducation.org/topic-central-valley-project [https://perma.cc/ 
NGD7-AUD8] (last visited Nov. 10, 2016) (“Constructed long ago by federal effort to help
create farmland, the Central Valley Project is one of the biggest water and transport systems in
the entire world.”).
74. See Gray, supra note 33, at 346–48 (“But one consequence [of this fragmented 
management and regulation] stands out: The absence of a forum or process to address the 
multiplicity of stressors means that regulation of one problem is likely to focus on one or 
a few sources to the exclusion of other contributing causes.”); see also California State
Water Project and the Central Valley Project, supra note 70; Erin Curtis, Reclamation 
Announces Biological Opinions 2014 Annual Science Review and Workshop for the Long-
Term Operation of the CVP/SWP, RECLAMATION (Oct. 30, 2014), http://www.usbr.gov/ 
newsroom/newsrelease/detail.cfm?RecordID=48073 [https://perma.cc/JR29-2M3A] (“The
2014 annual science review will be the fifth annual review.”).
 75. Lisabeth D. Rothman, The Water of Life: Litigation Over Water Rights has Tested
the Competing Interests of Environmentalists, Farmers, and Cities, 37 L.A.LAW. 28, 30 (2014)
(“[The SWP] is implemented through delivery contracts to 29 agricultural and municipal 
water supply agencies known as the SWP contractors.”).  For a discussion of the ecological 
impacts of the SWP, see Shampa A. Panda, On Fish and Farms: The Future of Water in
California’s Central Valley After San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Authority v. Jewell, 
42 ECOLOGY L.Q. 397, 401–02 (2015) (“There have been a number of competing demands 
on CVP and SWP water in recent years that have contributed to deteriorating ecological
conditions in the Bay-Delta.”).
76. California State Water Project Overview, CAL. DEP’T OF WATER RES., http://www.
water.ca.gov/swp/ [https://perma.cc/6W27-P2MU] (last modified Aug. 11, 2010); History
of the State Water Project, supra note 72 (“In 1960, California voters approved $1.75 billion in
general obligation bonds to finance construction of the State Water Project.”). 
77. Susan Greene, WHAT’S THE PLAN? Second Draft of State Water Plan Lacks
Actionable Solutions to Looming Shortfall, Critics Say, COLO. INDEPENDENT (Sept. 4, 2015), 
http://www.coloradoindependent.com/155178/whats-the-plan-second-draft-of-state-water-plan-
lacks-actionable-solutions-to-looming-shortfall-critics-say [https://perma.cc/YQ7G-ANKS] 
(“Emulating those partnerships is unlikely now that the Bureau of Reclamation and Army
Corps of Engineers no longer have the budgets or mandates for projects that would be as 
legally risky and expensive as they are politically divisive.”).
1072
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C. Water Legislation is Moving in the Right Direction of
 
Overarching State Control 

Water legislation has historically arisen after almost every major drought
in California.78  Some important California water policy includes the Burns-
Porter Act of 1959, which authorized $1.75 billion in bonds to develop the
SWP; the creation of the State Water Resources Control Board in 1967, which 
regulates water rights and water quality; the Porter-Cologne Water Quality
Act of 1969, which provides California’s first comprehensive body of water 
quality law; the Delta Reform Act in 2009, which establishes policy goals 
and new management structure for the Delta; and finally, the Sustainable
Groundwater Management Act of 2014, which provides authority for local 
agencies to adopt groundwater management plans.79  California has experienced 
78. CAL GOV’T CODE § 66455.3 (West 2009) (“A tentative map application for a 
proposed subdivision . . . shall [be sent] to any [potential] water supplier.”); CAL GOV’T 
CODE § 66473.7 (West 2009) (defining, most notably, subdivision and water supply); CAL.
WATER CODE § 10631(a) (West 2009) (“[A plan shall] [d]escribe the service area of the 
supplier, including current and projected population, climate, and other demographic factors 
affecting the supplier’s water management planning.”); CAL. WATER CODE §§ 10720–
10736.6 (West Supp. 2016); CAL. WATER CODE §§ 10750 et seq. (West 2009) (explaining
that certain defined existing local agencies are allowed to develop a groundwater management 
plan in groundwater basins); JEANINE JONES, CAL. DEP’T OF WATER RES., CALIFORNIA’S 
MOST SIGNIFICANT DROUGHTS: COMPARING HISTORICAL AND RECENT CONDITIONS 1, 64– 
65 (2015), http://www.water.ca.gov/waterconditions/docs/California_Signficant_Droughts_
2015_small.pdf [https://perma.cc/CWT6-B3WE] (noting that after the 1987–1992 drought, 
California voters approved major water bonds providing funding for water management); id. 
(noting that the bonds included Proposition 204 in 1996 for $995 million, Proposition 13 in
2000 for $2.1 billion, Proposition 50 in 2002 for $3.44 billion, Proposition 84 in 2006 for $5.388
billion, Proposition 1E in 2006 for $4.09 billion, and Proposition 1 in 2014 for $7.14 billion); 
Water Facts and Spending, LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, http://www.lao.ca.gov/Resources/ 
Water [https://perma.cc/A9N6-WGB8] (last visited Nov. 12, 2016) (explaining that some
of the major drought years in California occurred in 1976–1977, 1987–1990, 2000–2002, 
2007–2009, and 2012–present). 
79. Water Facts and Spending, supra note 78.  Major state water legislation since 1980 
includes: (1) the 2001 “Show Me the Water” laws, which require local government verify long-
term water availability for new development with local water supplies; (2) the 2007 Central
Valley Flood Control Package, which includes general plans and zoning ordinances to comply
with the state plan of flood control, as well as placing liability on local governments for
floods in new urban development, and; (3) the 2009 Water Policy Package, which imposed
a new governance structure for the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta, the development of a 
delta plan, and recognition of reasonable use and the public trust as the foundation of California 
water resources management, as well as required local agencies to monitor groundwater 
basin elevation.  Kelly, supra note 63, at 71, 112. 
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major droughts in 1966, 1968, from 1976 to 1977, from 1987 to 1992, from
2006 to 2009, and from 2011 to the present.80 
The state legislature introduced the Sustainable Groundwater Management
Act of 2014 to preserve the future of California’s groundwater resources 
by limiting unsustainable water uses in areas at risk for overdraft due to
the drought.81  Therefore, the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act 
prohibits the issuance of permits in areas that cannot handle water extraction.82 
This Act gives local agencies sustainable plans and guidelines for managing
groundwater, where prior to the Act, local agencies had no groundwater
management or oversight capabilities.83  A local public agency that elects 
to become a groundwater sustainability agency (GSA) for the area is then
granted broad powers to implement the law.84  However, if the GSA fails 
80. Adam Krotin & Dru Marion, A History of Drought in California: Learning from the
Past, Looking to the Future, CIVIL EATS (Feb. 5, 2014), http://civileats.com/2014/02/05/a-
history-of-drought-in-california-learning-from-the-past-looking-to-the-future/ [https://perma.
cc/R9SB-WDHA] (explaining that California has suffered major droughts in 1928–1935,
1947–1950, 1959–1960, and 1976–1977, with many subsequent dry periods, notably in 2007–
2009, until the current drought); Paul Rogers, California Drought: Past Dry Periods Have
Lasted More Than 200 Years, Scientists Say, MERCURY NEWS (Jan. 25, 2014, 9:23 AM), 
http://www.mercurynews.com/science/ci_24993601/california-drought-past-dry-periods-have-
lasted-more [https://perma.cc/QW24-8XZG] (“The longest droughts of the 20th century, what
Californians think of as severe, occurred from 1987 to 1992 and from 1928 to 1934.”); id.
(“Both [of the longest recent droughts], Stine said, are minor compared to the ancient droughts 
of 850 to 1090 and 1140 to 1320.”); Water Facts and Spending, supra note 78 (noting that
the most significant statewide droughts according to their period of recorded hydrology
occurred during 1928–1934, 1976–1977, 1987–1992, and 2007–2009); see Kyle Kim &
Thomas Suh Lauder, Infographic 215 Drought Maps Show Just how Thirsty California has
Become, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-g-california- 
drought-map-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/5M9Z-AKWS] (providing a compilation of
drought maps to express California’s increasing state of drought). 
81. Sustainable Groundwater Management Act, 2014 Cal. Stat. ch. 347, 348 (codified
at CAL. WATER CODE §§ 10720 et seq. (West Supp. 2016)).
82. Id.
 83. Sustainable Groundwater Management, CAL. GROUNDWATER, http://groundwater.ca 
.gov/ [https://perma.cc/DA5K-ZUZW] (last modified May 23, 2016) (“For the first time 
in California history, the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (SGMA) empowers 
local agencies to adopt groundwater management plans that are tailored to the resources and needs 
of their communities.”); Sustainable Groundwater Management, ASS’N OF CAL.WATER AGENCIES, 
http://www.acwa.com/content/groundwater/groundwater-sustainability [https://perma.cc/7KPR- 
UBWD] (last visited Nov. 10, 2016) (explaining that under the Sustainable Groundwater 
Management Act of 2014, state intervention is allowed only if necessary to protect ground-
water resources). 
84. Kathryn L. Oehlschlager, The New Age of Water Regulation—Who Will Float 
to the Top?, 41 S.F. ATT’Y 14, 16 (2015) (“In response [to overdraft of California’s aquifers],
on September 16, 2014, the state legislature passed and Governor Brown signed a package 
of three bills that collectively constitute SGMA, creating an entirely new regulatory scheme 
governing extraction and use of California’s groundwater.”); id. (“The law will be implemented 
through a local public agency that elects to become a groundwater sustainability agency
(GSA) for the area.”).
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to adequately manage a water basin, the State Water Board has the authority
to manage the basin until the GSA has a new plan.85  Therefore, although cities 
and regions now have the power to control groundwater management, the State 
of California has the overarching power to set the appropriate standards 
and review the cities’ work.86 
Legislation continues to address the current drought.  The summer of
2015 marked the fourth consecutive driest “water year” in California’s 
notorious, drought-ridden history.87  In response to the water shortage, the
SWP only provided twenty percent of requested water deliveries in 2015.88 
California’s Governor Jerry Brown declared the drought an emergency in
January 2014, and in 2015, he issued an executive order that mandated
residents and businesses to reduce water use by twenty-five percent.89 While 
85. Oehlschlager, supra note 84 (“GSAs are granted broad powers, including the 
ability to require groundwater well registration, measurement of groundwater extraction,
and filing of annual extraction reports.”); Triggering State Intervention, CAL. WATER BDS., 
http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/water_issues/programs/gmp/docs/sgma/state_intervtrigg
ers_fs.pdf [https://perma.cc/MY3N-UBDP] (last updated Oct. 12, 2015) (“Under a limited 
set of circumstances, the State Water Resources Control Board may step in to help protect 
local groundwater sources.”); id. (“The earliest the State Water Board can implement State 
Intervention is 2017, when local agencies in high- and medium-priority basins must form 
GSAs.”).
86. Oehlschlager, supra note 84, at 14; Sustainable Groundwater Management, supra
note 83 (“[The Sustainable Groundwater Management Act] provides a framework for
sustainable management of groundwater supplies by local authorities, with a limited role
for state intervention only if necessary to protect the resource.”); id. (explaining that although 
California has a “limited role,” this does not change the fact that local agencies are ultimately
answerable to the state).
87. 2016 Drought Watch, ASS’N OF CAL. WATER AGENCIES, http://www.acwa.com/
content/drought [https://perma.cc/ST33-BHDX] (last visited Nov. 10, 2016) (“In 2015, as local 
water agencies responded to a fourth year of historic drought, ACWA launched a new
interactive gallery to showcase the plethora of local agency drought response activities by
ACWA members statewide.”); Explanations for the National Water Conditions, U.S.
GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, http://water.usgs.gov/nwc/explain_data.html [https://perma.cc/HDD8- 
TAYQ] (last modified Feb. 10, 2016) (“The term U.S. Geological Survey ‘water year’
in reports that deal with the surface-water supply is defined as the 12-month period October
1, for any given year through September 30, of the following year.”).
88. Oehlschlager, supra note 84, at 15; Amy Quinton, State Water Project to Deliver
More Water This Year, CAP. PUB. RADIO (Jan. 26, 2016), http://www.capradio.org/articles/ 
2016/01/26/state-water-project-to-deliver-more-water-this-year/ [https://perma.cc/Z64R-78LY]
(“The California Department of Water Resources says it will increase water deliveries to
meet 15-percent of requests, up from 10 percent in December.”); id. (“Last year, the State
Water Project was able to meet 20 percent of requests for water.”).
89.  Exec. Order No. B-29-15 (Apr. 1, 2015), https://www.gov.ca.gov/docs/4.1.15_ 
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some describe Governor Brown’s order as a “heavy-handed” approach to 
water management, his order was necessary to address the severity of the 
drought.90  Governor Brown rightly declares California’s current situation
as a “state of emergency” in the order, which requires the State Water Board 
to restrict the use of potable water on campuses, golf courses, cemeteries,
and prohibit irrigation of street medians with potable water.91  The order also 
requires the State Water Board to “direct urban water suppliers to develop rate
structures and other pricing mechanisms . . . to maximize conservation.”92 
Regulators are also imposing fines on communities that consistently fail to
meet water reduction goals.93 Although the state can impose fines on 
communities that overuse water as Governor Brown recommends, imposing
consequences after the water has already been wasted is not an adequate
solution.94  If the state was in total control of water management rather than
private water rights holders, water use could be more efficient.  California 
Executive_Order.pdf [https://perma.cc/J89D-3EQ9]; Sharon Bernstein, California Met Water 
Conservation Goals for August, State Says, REUTERS (Oct. 1, 2015, 12:44 PM), http://www. 
reuters.com/article/us-usa-drought-idUSKCN0RV56X20151001 [https://perma.cc/6SUH-DTK8].
90. Oehlschlager, supra note 84, at 14 (“The order takes a heavy-handed approach
to managing urban water use, mandating reductions in statewide use compared to 2013 
levels.”); Facts About the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act from Kahn, Soares 
& Conway, KAHN, SOARES & CONWAY, LLP, http://www.ksclawyers.com/sustainable-
ground-water-management-act-for-california [https://perma.cc/C783-98Q2] (last visited 
Nov. 10, 2016) (describing the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act as ambiguous 
and problematic because it gives the state significant authority in “monitoring the extraction of
groundwater and [the] imposition of fees.”). 
91. Exec. Order No. B-29-15 (Apr. 1, 2015), https://www.gov.ca.gov/docs/4.1.15_
Executive_Order.pdf [https://perma.cc/6SUH-DTK8]; Oehlschlager, supra note 84, at 15
(“It requires the State Water Resources Control Board (State Water Board) to impose restrictions 
on use of potable water on campuses, golf courses, and cemeteries, and to prohibit irrigations
of street medians with potable water.”); see also Implementing the Sustainable Groundwater
Management Act: The Importance of Local Agency and Stakeholder Participation, MAVEN’S 
NOTEBOOK (Jan. 6, 2016), http://mavensnotebook.com/2016/01/06/implementing-the-sustainable-
groundwater-management-act-the-importance-of-local-agency-and-stakeholder-participation/
[https://perma.cc/A3GG-ETQM] (discussing that public meetings are scheduled to understand
the “issues and challenges from the stakeholder perspective” regarding the groundwater
sustainability plan regulations).
92. Exec. Order No. B-29-15 (Apr. 1, 2015), https://www.gov.ca.gov/docs/4.1.15_
Executive_Order.pdf [https://perma.cc/6SUH-DTK8].
93. Kristin J. Bender, California Fines Water Suppliers for Failure to Cut Back, BUS.
INSIDER (Oct. 30, 2015, 8:45 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/ap-california-fines-
water-suppliers-for-failure-to-cut-back-2015-10 [https://perma.cc/V329-53B5] (“The $61,000 
fines are being imposed on Beverly Hills, Indio, Redlands and the Coachella Valley Water 
District.”); Bernstein, supra note 89. 
94. Associated Press, California Gov. Jerry Brown Wants $10,000 Fines For Water
Wasters, USA TODAY (Apr. 29, 2015, 4:11 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/
nation/2015/04/29/jerry-brown-water-wasters-10000/26559955/ [https://perma.cc/LA74-4H8M]
(noting that Governor Brown recommended fining residents and businesses that waste the
most water as part of a legislative proposal to expand water restriction enforcement). 
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also cannot rely on the hope of rainfall to resolve all of the state’s persistent 
water shortage problems.95  Governor Brown’s order evidences that the state
is already increasing its control over water use to combat the persistent
drought.96  This increase in control will likely only lead to more state control 
over water resources, which could be authorized via an amendment to the
California Constitution specifically enabling this power. 
D. Land Use Planning Laws Do Not Yet Synchronize 

With Water Laws 

When California’s population expanded rapidly in the mid-1900s, and
water resources became scarce, zoning and land-planning strategies became
prevalent.97  Land developers began claiming water rights through prescription.98 
Under prescription, water rights vest after five years of open, notorious, and
 95. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2; Associated Press, supra note 94 (“California is in its 
fourth year of drought, and state officials fear it may last as long as a decade.”); see also
FIRMACION &RASKIN, supra note 6, at 19 (“After yet another rainless winter, Californians must
confront the fact that drought might be the new normal.”); Dennis Dimick (@ddimick), 
TWITTER (Feb. 11, 2016, 4:46 AM), https://twitter.com/ddimick/status/69776363181194 
8544?lang=en [https://twitter.com/ddimick/status/697763631811948544?lang=en] 
(“Research: Dry is the new normal in Southwest U.S.”). 
96. See Exec. Order No. B-29-15 (Apr. 1, 2015), https://www.gov.ca.gov/docs/4.1.15
_Executive_Order.pdf [https://perma.cc/6SUH-DTK8]; Paul Rogers, California’s Drought:
How Will We Know When It’s Over?, MERCURY NEWS (Jan. 9, 2016, 9:40 AM), http:// 
www.mercurynews.com/drought/ci_29364616/california-drought-how-will-we-know-when-its 
[https://perma.cc/UB5K-79FQ] (“But for [the drought to end this year], as California enters the
fifth year of the worst drought in the state’s history, rains will have to continue arriving in 
pounding, relentless waves through April to fill depleted reservoirs and dry rivers and push
the Sierra snowpack to at least 150 percent of normal.”). 
97. FIRMACION &RASKIN, supra note 6, at 15 (“In the middle of the twentieth century, . . .
land planners began to use land-planning strategies such as zoning and general plans to ensure
that future growth fit into a comprehensive plan.”); see A Brief History of Planning & Zoning
in Los Angeles, L.A. DEP’T OF CITY PLANNING (Jan. 6, 2014), http://recode.la/updates/news/ 
brief-history-planning-zoning-los-angeles [https://perma.cc/36M3-969Z] (“United States 
Army Engineer Lieutenant E.O.C. Ord completes the City’s first official survey and mapping 
[in 1849] under American rule.”).
98. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1007 (West 2007); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 321 (West 2006);
Peck v. Howard, 73 Cal. App. 2d 308, 311 (Ct. App. 1946) (applying a five-part test to 
determine if the landowner had a prescriptive water right, including whether the use was 
1) actual, 2) open and notorious, 3) hostile and adverse to the original owner’s title,
4) continuous and uninterrupted, and 5) under a claim of title); FIRMACION & RASKIN, 
supra note 6, at 15; see Winnifred C. Ward, Shattered Plans: Amending a General Plan 
Through the Initiative Process, 26 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1005, 1006 (1993) (“Problems arise 
when growth-control initiatives conflict with a city’s general plan.” (citation omitted)).
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continuous use of water that belongs to someone else, such as a riparian.99 
Landowners could use prescription because some courts have found that 
water rights are essentially property rights.100  According to California law, 
“all water within the State is the property of the people of the State, but the 
right to the use of water may be acquired by appropriation in the manner 
provided by law.”101  Therefore, water rights include the right to use water, 
but not the right to own water or a waterway.102  However, once water rights
are acquired, some courts have found that the water rights become vested 
property rights, and this distinction is important and inconsistent in California 
water law.103  Prescriptive rights were subsequently limited in several
California Supreme Court cases, which reinforced the seniority of preexisting 
water users and the notion that prescriptive water rights holders are subject to
the state’s regulatory authority.104 
Land development is still not harmonized with water supplies statewide.
Local land use decisions in California have resulted in a “destructive cycle of 
inefficient use of water, fragmented habitat, destabilized streams, and engineered
solutions to disrupted flow patterns.”105  In California, there are no laws that
 99. CIV. § 1007; CIV. PROC. § 321; FIRMACION & RASKIN, supra note 6, at 15. 
Interestingly, many states do not recognize a water right if it is obtained through adverse 
possession. Robert A. Pulver, Comment, Liability Rules as a Solution to the Problem of 
Waste in Western Water Law: An Economic Analysis, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 671, 676 (1988) 
(“Prescription claims in water law, however, are difficult to acquire because of the nature
of water rights.”). 
100. Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. All Parties, 306 P.2d 824, 848 (Cal. 1957) (holding
that riparian rights are property rights which vest in the owner and are protected by state 
and federal Constitutions and cannot be limited or impaired without due process and just 
compensation), rev’d on other grounds, Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 
275 (1958); Jurupa Ditch Co. v. San Bernardino Cnty., 63 Cal. Rptr. 764, 767 (Ct. App. 
1967) (“[A]n appropriative right to take water from a stream is real property, is a fee simple
interest and subject to taxation . . . .”).
101. CAL. WATER CODE § 102 (West 2009). 
102. Rancho Santa Margarita v. Vail, 81 P.2d 533, 560 (Cal. 1938) (“The riparian
does not ‘own’ the water of a stream—he ‘owns’ a usufructuary—the right of reasonable 
use of the water on his riparian land when he needs it.”) (citations omitted).
103. Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist., 306 P.2d at 848; Jurupa Ditch Co., 63 Cal. Rptr. at 
767; see Sarah Wilson, Private Property and the Public Trust: A Theory for Preserving 
the Coastal Zone, 4 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 57, 58 (1984) (“The clash between public 
needs and private rights has made clear the need to reevaluate traditional notions of private 
property.”). 
104. See, e.g., City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 5 P.3d 853, 863 (Cal. 2000)
(“One with overlying rights has rights superior to that of other persons who lack legal 
priority, but is nonetheless restricted to a reasonable beneficial use.”); People v. Shirokow, 
605 P.2d 859, 866 (Cal. 1980) (holding that the defendant could not divert water owned 
by the state without first obtaining a permit from the State Water Board); FIRMACION &
RASKIN, supra note 6, at 16. 
105. Addressing the Disconnect: Water Resources and Local Land Use, LOCAL GOV’T 
COMM’N (2015), http://www.lgc.org/resources/water/disconnect/ [https://perma.cc/SP3Q-
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specifically prohibit land development when there is no adequate water
supply to support a new development.106  However, counties and cities must 
adopt a “general plan” for their own physical development, which includes a
“conservation element” for the conservation, development, and utilization
of natural resources, including water.107  The water portion of the conservation
element must be “coordinated” with water agencies.108 The conservation 
element of the general plan includes an assessment of water supply and 
demand.109  To assuage the problem of coordinating water conservation while
allowing for land development, “Show Me the Water laws” were enacted in
2001, which require land developers to conduct a “water supply assessment”
before building large-scale developments.110  However, water regulators
3EX6] (last visited Nov. 10, 2016).  For a basic overview of the land planning process for 
local elected and appointed officials and the general public, see Steve Sanders, et al.,
Understanding the Basics of Land Use and Planning, INST. FOR LOCAL GOV’T (2010),
http://www.ca-ilg.org/sites/main/files/file-attachments/2010_-_LandUsePlanning_w.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/HL4U-BUUP] (“The guide describes the typical participants in the planning 
process and the major plans and policies that comprise the framework of local planning.”). 
106. FIRMACION & RASKIN, supra note 6, at 19 (“Although California has taken some 
steps to align land planning with water management, these two areas of regulation remain 
disconnected in many respects.”).
107. See CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 65302–65303.4 (West 2010 & Supp. 2016).  For an 
example of San Diego’s Land Use Element in the city’s General Plan, see Land Use Element, 
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO GEN. PLAN 1, 44 (2011), http://www.sandiegocounty.gov/content/
dam/sdc/pds/gpupdate/docs/GP/LandUseElement.pdf [https://perma.cc/DE49-K4B5] (last visited 
Nov. 10, 2016) (“Coordinate water infrastructure planning with land use planning to maintain
an acceptable availability of a high quality sustainable water supply.”). 
108. GOV’T § 65302(d)(1).  Interestingly, Texas has a similar coordination requirement in
its Municipal Codes.  See HIGHLAND VILLAGE, TEX. CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 28, art. II, § 11(a)
(2009), http://z2.franklinlegal.net/franklin/Z2Browser2.html?showset=highlandvillageset 
[https://perma.cc/AX7X-VW44] (“The purpose of the [site plan] review is to ensure efficient 
and safe land development, harmonious use of land, . . . and adequate water supply.”). 
109. GOV’T § 65302(d)(1) (“A conservation element for the conservation, development, 
and utilization of natural resources including water.”); id. (“The conservation element shall 
consider the effect of development within the jurisdiction, as described in the land use
element.”).  For a discussion of water supply and demand in California, see Water Supply
and Demand, UNIV. OF CAL. AGRIC. ISSUES CTR. (July 2009), https://www.cdfa.ca.gov/ 
agvision/docs/Water_Supply_and_Demand.pdf [https://perma.cc/K5JS-2SNU] (“[U]rban
and industrial water demand has risen as the population has continued to grow.”).
110. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 66455.3 (West 2009); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 66473.7 (West 
2009 & Supp. 2016); CAL. WATER CODE § 10631 (West 1992 & Supp. 2016); Ellen Hanak, 
Show Me the Water Plan: Urban Water Management Plans and California’s Water Supply 
Adequacy Laws, 4 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 69, 70 (2010) (“[Show me the water laws] 
aim to forge an often missing link in California’s local planning process.”); see Barry
Epstein, Friant Dam Holding Contracts: Not an Entitlement to Water Supply Under SB 
610, 4 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 91, 93 (2010) (“Thus, a water supply assessment is 
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cannot stop land development even if it adversely affects water supply.111 
Therefore, when the state lacks the necessary control to require local land
developers and water resource managers to coordinate with each other, it 
creates major issues and depletes water resources.112  This is becoming an
increasingly grave situation as California’s growth and urbanization are
projected to increase dramatically.113 
III. THREE THEORIES SUPPORT THE PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE CHANGES 

TO CENTRALIZE WATER RIGHTS AND CREATE UNIFORMITY
 
IN FUTURE LAND DEVELOPMENT
 
The California state legislature should have the power to take direct control 
of private water use rights to ensure efficient water use throughout the state. 
The legal justifications include the public trust doctrine, the doctrine of eminent
domain, and use regulations. 
A. California Should Reclaim Private Water Use Rights 
The state must take complete control of private water use rights to ensure
that the state’s water is put to reasonable and beneficial use.114  This will
end inefficient water use and distribution, such as the approval of new land
development where water is scarce, especially in this period of drought.115 
required when there is a ‘project’ within the meaning of SB 610 and when review is required 
for that project under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).”). 
111. GOV’T § 66455.3; GOV’T § 66473.7; WATER § 10631; see FIRMACION & RASKIN, 
supra note 6, at 19; see About Smart Growth, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa. 
gov/smartgrowth/about-smart-growth [https://perma.cc/BY4A-255P] (last updated July 19,
2016) (explaining that smart growth, development and conservation strategies that protect 
the environment, is the EPA’s program intended to protect water and other natural resources 
across the United States).
112. See FIRMACION & RASKIN, supra note 6, at 19. 
113. Addressing the Disconnect: Water Resources and Local Land Use, supra note 
105 (“The California Department of Finance’s projections are for 15% population growth by
2010, 31% by 2020, and 69% by 2040”); see Dan Walters, Census Bureau Says California 
the Most Urbanized State, SACRAMENTO BEE (Mar. 26, 2012, 10:48 AM), http://blogs.
sacbee.com/capitolalertlatest/2012/03/census-bureau-says-california-the-most-urbanized-
state.html [https://perma.cc/G5EZ-NSV4] (“California may lead the nation in agricultural 
production, but being a society of great contrasts, it’s also the nation’s most urbanized state,
according to a new Census Bureau report.”); id. (“The nation’s four most densely populated
urban areas are in California.”).
114. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2; United States v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 227 Cal. 
Rptr. 161, 171 (Ct. App. 1986) (“The courts have construed [the ‘rule of reasonable use’] as a
valid exercise of the police power of the state to regulate the use and enjoyment of water
rights for the public benefit.” (citations omitted)).
115. See James, supra note 2; see Key Facts About Growth and California’s Water Supplies,
LOCAL GOV’T COMM’N, http://www.lgc.org/wordpress/docs/resources/water/water_livable_
communities.pdf [https://perma.cc/7LED-3TL6] (last visited Nov. 10, 2016) (“According 
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California could distribute water more efficiently if the state took more 
direct control of private water use rights existing in the state, especially
including senior water rights. For example, riparians can reasonably use 
water; however, riparians, by virtue of living close to a water supply,
undoubtedly have easy access to water and can use a limitless amount of 
water.116  Senior water rights, however, are not as legally secure as once
believed, because in addition to the existing use of “conservation,”
“curtailment” is becoming an “emerging term in the water lexicon,”
as California law allows the State Water Board to enforce its emergency 
water regulations through cease-and-desist orders and fines on water use.117 
Senior water rights may thus legally be curtailed to preserve water.118  The
SWP is already taking initiative with water deliveries to senior water rights
holders.119  For example, the SWP is only delivering about twenty percent
to the U.S. EPA and the California State Water Resources Control Board, the greatest single
threat to local water supplies is growth.”); see, e.g., Frank Deford, Water-Thirsty Golf Courses 
Need to go Green, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (June 11, 2008, 12:01 AM), http://www.npr.org/templates/ 
story/story.php?storyId=91363837 [https://perma.cc/6WKW-HBXH] (“Audubon International 
estimates that the average American course uses 312,000 gallons per day.”). 
116. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2 (“[B]ecause of the conditions prevailing in this State 
the general welfare requires that the water resources of the State be put to beneficial use 
to the fullest extent of which they are capable, and that the waste or unreasonable use or
unreasonable method of use of water be prevented.”); see State Water Res. Control Bd.,
227 Cal. Rptr. at 171 (“This ‘rule of reasonable use’ is now the cardinal principle of
California’s water law.”); Peabody v. City of Vallejo, 40 P.2d 486, 498–99 (Cal. 1935) 
(finding that the constitutional limitation applies “to all water rights enjoyed or asserted in
this state, whether the same be grounded on the riparian right or . . . the appropriative right”);
Miller & Lux v. Enter. Canal & Land Co., 147 P. 567, 570 (Cal. 1915) (“Under the established 
law of riparian rights, a title by prescription cannot be acquired against a tract of riparian 
land by diverting the water from the stream at a point below such land.”).
117. Henderson, supra note 38, at 14 (“Therefore, curtailment is another emerging term
in the water lexicon, hidden in the story of the 2014 drought and an emotional challenge 
for water rights holders, formerly confident that their rights were secure.”).
118. Dale Kasler & Ryan Sabalow, California Curtails Senior Water Rights, 
SACRAMENTO BEE (June 12, 2015, 9:31 AM), http://www.sacbee.com/news/state/california/
water-and-drought/article23849281.html [https://perma.cc/ZE4Y-2HLT] (explaining that the
State Water Resources Control Board ordered farmers and municipal users with senior water
rights to stop pulling water out of California’s rivers, a controversial move that will be followed 
by fining noncompliant rights holders and litigation by others); see Henderson, supra note
38, at 14. 
119. SINA DARABZAND, CAL. NAT. RES. AGENCY, MEMORANDUM: STATE WATER 
PROJECT DELIVERY CAPABILITY REPORT 2015, at 2, 20, 23 (July 1, 2015), https://msb.
water.ca.gov/documents/86800/144575dd-0be1-4d2d-aeff-8d7a2a7b21e4 (explaining that State 
Water Project exports have decreased since 2005, and under existing conditions, the average 
annual delivery of water estimated for this 2015 Report is 2,550 taf/year, 3 taf less than
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of requested water deliveries to Central Valley farmers this year to combat
the negative consequences of the drought.120  California farmers are a major 
group of pre-1914 appropriators—senior water rights holders who have a 
seniority claim to water.121  Although delivering water to farmers is important 
for California’s croplands, agriculture uses the most water of any other
consumer group in the state.122  Curtailing and gaining control of this use 
exemplifies how the State Water Board’s power has already grown to impose
cuts and measure how water is used in California, and thus is one step toward 
increased direct state control of water.123  Because these rights may be curtailed 
and these rights have the highest priority in the California water rights system, 
the state should be given the explicit power through a constitutional
the 2,553 taf/year estimated for the 2013 Report); id. (noting that “Taf” stands for thousand 
acre-foot). 
120. Oehlschlager, supra note 84, at 15 (“For the second year in a row, Central Valley
Farmers are expecting no deliveries from the valley’s big federal irrigation project, and the
State Water Project will provide only 20 percent of requested deliveries this year.”); Doug
Carlson & Ted Thomas, State Water Project Deliveries Increased Slightly, CAL. DEP’T OF
WATER RES. (Mar. 2, 2015), http://www.water.ca.gov/news/newsreleases/2015/030215 
allocation.pdf [https://perma.cc/3PZQ-5UBC] (“Few storms have graced California so far
this winter, but those that did . . . will allow the California Department of Water Resources 
(DWR) to increase water deliveries to most customers of the State Water Project (SWP).”);
id. (“The additional deliveries will increase this year’s SWP allocation from fifteen to
twenty percent.”).
121. Water Rights Process, supra note 22 (“Up to the early 1900’s appropriators—
most of them miners and nonriparian farmers—had simply taken control of and used what 
water they wanted.”); see Alison Verkshin, California Farmers Fight for Century-Old Claims
to Water, BLOOMBERG POLITICS (July 17, 2015, 2:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
politics/articles/2015-07-17/california-farmers-fight-for-century-old-claims-to-water [https:// 
perma.cc/YV25-Z8ML] (“California farmers whose families have held rights to water since the
Gold Rush are fighting cutbacks sought by [the California State Water Resources Control 
Board].”). 
122. Jennifer Medina, California Cuts Farmer’s Share of Scant Water, N.Y.TIMES (June
12, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/13/us/california-announces-restrictions-on-
water-use-by-farmers.html (“[T]he state now has more authority to impose cuts and a greater
ability to measure how water from the Sacramento-San Joaquin River Delta is used.”); id.
(“Gov. Jerry Brown received repeated and intense criticism after he issued mandatory cuts
on urban water use but exempted farmers.”); id. (“In a normal year, agriculture uses about 
80 percent of the water consumed in the state.”).  For a discussion of California’s agricultural
industry increase in 2014, see Phillip Reese & Dale Kasler, California Farms Added Workers 
in 2014, Even Amid the Drought, SACRAMENTO BEE (May 19, 2015, 5:01 PM), http://www.
sacbee.com/news/state/california/water-and-drought/article21450660.html [https://perma.cc/
G8N5-W2KW].
123. California Farmers Worry Senior Water Rights Cuts in Drought Could be
Devastating, CBS SACRAMENTO (June 12, 2015, 11:56 PM), http://sacramento.cbslocal.com/ 
2015/06/12/california-farmers-worry-senior-water-rights-cuts-in-drought-could-be-devastating/ 
[https://perma.cc/3ZRU-K9JP] (“California ordered dramatic cuts to farmers who have water
rights dating back more than 100 years . . . the impacts will be felt far and wide.”); see Oehlschlager, 
supra note 84, at 15, 16. 
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amendment to revoke these rights and redistribute the water in an appropriate
and fair method.
The system of seniority in water rights appropriation is not a logical policy
in California today.124  Simply because some groups of people came
to California earlier than others and took control of water should not entitle 
them to invincible water rights that take seniority over most others.125  The
prioritization of senior water rights over junior water rights when curtailment
is necessary is no longer logical today, and thus the state should take back
senior water rights.126  Although riparians, for example, have water rights
based on their natural proximity to a water source, this does not mean junior 
water rights holders should sacrifice their right to use water before senior
water rights holders’ rights are affected at all.127  This is an area of law where
the state should take control to not only create efficiency in water distribution 
but to also promote equality among citizens, regardless of whether they live 
next to a water source. 
124. Peter Gleick, co-founder of the Pacific Institute, a think tank that focuses on water
issues, commented on the outdated system of senior water rights in California, stating: 
The system of senior water rights might have made sense 100 years ago, but given
our new realities, it is not going to work in the long run [because the current
approach] neither protects the environment nor ensures efficient use of our limited 
water, it just clarifies who was there first.
Lisa M. Krieger, California Drought: Farmers’ ‘Senior’ Water Rights Under Siege, MERCURY 
NEWS (May 28, 2015, 9:04 AM), http://www.mercurynews.com/drought/ci_28208027/ 
california-drought-farmers-senior-water-rights-under-siege [https://perma.cc/XZ76-V7GR];
see California Water Rights Primer, CAL. WATER IMPACT NETWORK, https://www.c-win.org/ 
water-rights-primer.html [https://perma.cc/H48P-5E6E] (last visited Nov. 10, 2016) (“Further,
there is a seniority system in place for appropriative water rights holders.”); id. (“Those
with rights resulting from pre-1914 filing claims have priority over all other appropriative 
water rights holders.”). 
125. Water Rights Process, supra note 22 (explaining that junior water rights are 
curtailed before senior water rights).  For an explanation of Colorado’s similar curtailment
method, see Water Law, DENVER WATER, http://www.denverwater.org/AboutUs/WaterLaw/
 [https://perma.cc/S5ZL-9YNF] (last visited Nov. 10, 2016). 
126. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 5 (“The use of all water now appropriated, or that may
hereafter be appropriated . . . is hereby declared to be a public use, and subject to the regulation 
and control of the State.”); Elise O’Dea, Note, Reviving California’s Public Trust Doctrine 
and Taking a Proactive Approach to Water Management, Just in Time for Climate Change, 41 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 435, 453, n.151 (2014). 
127. Kurtis Alexander, 5 Fixes for California’s Age-Old Water-Rights System, S.F.
CHRON. (Sept. 13, 2015, 3:05 PM) http://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/article/5-fixes-for- 
California-s-age-old-water-rights-6497184.php [https://perma.cc/Z39A-X5QM] (explaining
how the town of Mountain House’s water was threatened to be shut off to protect more senior
claims to water); Water Rights Process, supra note 22. 
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Taking away private water rights could create tension between local and 
state governmental control; however, this proposal does not suggest 
eliminating local control, but rather recommends making cities and their 
constituents answerable to the State Water Board’s direct, overarching 
control. In 1962, the Assembly Water Committee concluded: “water agencies
expressed a strong desire to solve their problems and manage groundwater
basins locally.”128  This is likely still true today; however, California is
suffering a serious drought and needs more state oversight.129  Groundwater 
is one division of water with influences of both local and state-level
government, but would be better managed if the state had more oversight 
authority.  The Sustainable Groundwater Management Act, for example, 
is a step in the right direction because the state cannot control every small 
aspect of water development in every city across the state.130  Delegating 
power is a good thing as long as the cities and regions must still answer 
to the Legislature through the State Water Board.  In implementing this 
Act, the state insists that groundwater is managed at the local level, but the
state also asserts its own authority because it can check the local government’s 
128. ASSEM. INTERIM COMM. ON WATER TO THE CAL. LEGISLATURE, GROUND WATER
PROBLEMS IN CAL., 26 ASSEM. INTERIM COMM. REP. 46 (1962).  For an example of a
successful fight for publicly owned water in Felton, California, (as opposed to a privately
owned water system), see Dr. Adam Davidson-Harden, Susan Spronk, David McDonald, &
Karen Bakker, Local Control and Management of our Water Commons, ON THE COMMONS
47, 48 (2008) http://www.onthecommons.org/sites/default/files/WaterCommons08.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PJ4M-KRSK]. 
129. Stevens, supra note 25; Pamela Martineau, Groundwater Fixes Require Local Control 
with State Backstop, Comprehensive Water Planning, Speakers Say, ASS’N OF CAL. WATER
AGENCIES (June 3, 2014, 4:44 PM), http://www.acwa.com/news/groundwater/ground 
water-fixes-require-local-control-state-backstop-comprehensive-water-planning [https://perma.cc/
5DVA-FPUF] (“Improving California’s groundwater sustainability requires strong oversight 
by local entities with backup support from the state, as well as a comprehensive statewide 
water planning that improves surface water availability.”).  For an example of one local 
oversight program by the state government, see UST Local Oversight Program (LOP) 
Guidebook, STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD. 1, 3 (2010), http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/ust/
contacts/docs/lop_guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/3FFM-5X64] (“The objective of the LOP 
Agency Contract is to provide the Contractor with the means to identify and oversee the 
investigation and remediation of UST petroleum release sites.”); id. (“The contract is part
of the State’s overall program, referred to as the Local Oversight Program (LOP), to help
assist governmental agencies in oversight and remediation at UST release sites.”). 
130. See CAL. WATER CODE §§ 10720–10736.6 (West Supp. 2016); Ryan Sabalow, 
Tensions, Threats as California’s New Groundwater Law Takes Shape, SACRAMENTO BEE
(Nov. 21, 2015, 4:01 PM), http://www.sacbee.com/news/state/california/water-and-drought/ 
article45802360.html [https://perma.cc/S8CC-3KRM] (explaining how the state’s first 
groundwater regulations called for the creation of new local agencies, state oversight of the
local agencies, increased local control, and left many unanswered questions about how exactly
the local management agencies should be created). 
1084
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work.131  Complete overhaul of all local duties would be overwhelming for the
state and would require a massive transformation of management, so this 
Act is a step in the right direction.  The Sustainable Groundwater Management
Act also links groundwater to surface water for the first time, recognizing 
that water is a single resource and should be regulated with one cohesive 
policy.132 
The following is an example of a local battle that inhibited coordinated 
management of resources, and emphasizes why the state as a single overarching 
entity should eventually be in total control of water management.133 In 
2013, the Southern California Central Basin aquifer had unused groundwater 
storage space that could be managed to hold more water to support many
more families than it did.134  At this time, the Basin held enough water to
meet the needs of about 475,000 families for one year, but it had the capacity
 131. See Sustainable Groundwater Management, CAL.DEP’T OF WATER RES., http://www.
water.ca.gov/groundwater/sgm/index.cfm [https://perma.cc/M9B2-YM7H] (last updated 
Nov. 9, 2016) (explaining that the Department of Water Resources’ Draft Strategic Plan
“outlines key actions DWR will undertake over the next several years to position itself 
better to support local agencies across California to achieve sustainable groundwater
management”); see also Groundwater Sustainability Program Draft Strategic Plan, CAL.
DEP’T OF WATER RES. 1, 4 (2015), http://www.water.ca.gov/groundwater/sgm/pdfs/_GSP 
_DraftStrategicPlanMarch2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/VC72-J2CC]. 
132. See WATER §§ 10720–10736.6 (explaining how there are so many distinctions
between categories of water that it has become difficult to provide water without consistent 
structure and unified control); Felicity Barringer, Psst . . . Groundwater and Surface Water Do
Mix, N.Y. TIMES: GREEN (Feb. 3, 2011, 11:48 AM), http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/ 
02/03/psst-groundwater-and-surface-water-do-mix/?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/9PCN-L4VT]
(“But, as demonstrated by the hearing called by Assemblyman Jared Huffman, chairman 
of the water and parks committee, the effort to manage groundwater as if it were part of 
the surface water system may finally be gathering momentum.”). 
133. See Tina Cannon Leahy, Desperate Times Call for Sensible Measures: The Making of
the California Sustainable Groundwater Management Act, 9 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 
5, 37 (2016) (“DWR’s role in providing technical assistance and review contrasted with
the State Water Board’s role as the groundwater ‘police’ and reflected stakeholders’ views 
of DWR as a non-regulatory agency and the State Water Board as a regulator.”); see also
Michelle Chester, Clarifying the Roles of Water Providers in Southern California, 44 MCGEORGE
L. REV. 803, 804–05 (2013). 
134. See Chester, supra note 133, at 804 (“[T]he Southern California Central Basin
aquifer stores enough water to meet the water needs of approximately 475,000 families for 
one year.”); id. (“However, the Basin has the capacity to hold enough water to support an 
additional 660,000 families.”); see also Peter H. Gleick, State Needs More Water Storage 
– Underfoot, PAC. INST. (Jan. 8, 2011), http://pacinst.org/publication/state-needs-more-
water-storage-underfoot/ [https://perma.cc/D6L5-8D9H ] (explaining how California needs
more below-surface groundwater storage, and having unused storage space should therefore be 
utilized).
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to hold enough water to support another 660,000 families.135  The basin’s
capacity was underused due to a “bureaucratic battle” between the Water
Replenishment District of Southern California (WRD), a regional groundwater 
management agency, and the Central Basin Municipal Water District
(CBMWD), a governmental agency that caters to municipalities, over the
right to control groundwater storage.136 Chapter 215, which amended
California Water Code Section 71610, ended the battle and handed
management control of groundwater resources to the WRD; however, “it 
remains to be seen whether the WRD will ultimately resolve Los Angeles 
County’s groundwater management issues.”137  This bureaucratic battle stood 
in the way of delivering water to citizens at a reasonable price and inhibited 
environmentally friendly use of water. This battle could have been avoided 
if one branch of government, the California state legislature, had the highest 
control over water management and could resolve such disputes at the
onset. 
B. Public Trust Doctrine: Recognizing the State as the Public’s Water 
Trustee Defends the State Against Takings Claims 
The public trust doctrine provides one justification for the California
State Legislature to take control of water use rights and thus have direct 
control of statewide water management. 
135. CENT. BASIN MUN. WATER DIST., DRAFT PROGRAM ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT 
REPORT 310 (2011), http://www.centralbasin.org/assets/press_releases/Program%20PEIR,
%20November%202011.pdf [https://perma.cc/QBU7-25UR] (clarifying the historical amount 
of direct groundwater recharge in the Central Basin in Figure 4.8.13); Chester, supra note 
133, at 804.  For a discussion of groundwater basin over-pumping, see Bettina Boxall,
Overpumping of Central Valley Groundwater Creating a Crisis, Experts Say, L.A. TIMES
(Mar. 18, 2015, 4:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-ground water-
20150318-story.html [https://perma.cc/9JE4-29KT] (“Parts of the San Joaquin Valley are
deflating like a tire with a slow leak as growers pull more and more water from the
ground.”). 
136. Sam Allen, Feud Between Two Obscure Water Agencies Costs Consumers, 
L.A. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/apr/25/local/la-me-water-
wars-20120425 [https://perma.cc/C4LV-VRUT] (“[The Central Basin Municipal Water
District and Water Replenishment District of Southern California]—which serve more 
than a third of the nearly 10 million residents of L.A. County—have more than doubled 
their fees in recent years while spending significant amounts of time and money battling 
each other in a series of lawsuits . . . .”); Chester, supra note 133, at 805 (noting that the 
WRD and CBMWD’s “bureaucratic battle for the right to control the region’s groundwater
storage” resulted in the Central Basin having remaining storage space).
137. Chester, supra note 133, at 810.  For an explanation of how groundwater
banking may be a solution to California’s groundwater problems, see Erica Gies, Water in 
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1. Historical Support for the Public Trust Doctrine 
The public trust doctrine originated in Roman and English law and has 
an inherent attribute of state sovereignty.138 Under the public trust doctrine,
the state is trustee of certain natural resources held “in public trust” for the 
people, and it limits the purposes for which trust resources can be used.139 
In California, the reasonable use principle and public trust doctrine prevail 
over water management policy, especially in the Delta.140  The public trust
doctrine also bolsters California’s constitutional amendment requiring 
reasonable and beneficial water use, because it grants the state government 
power to supervise water use.141 
138. Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Origins of the American Public 
Trust Doctrine: What Really Happened in Illinois Central, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 799, 800 
(2004) (“The public trust doctrine, a jarring exception of uncertain dimensions, posits that 
some resources are subject to a perpetual trust that forecloses private exclusion rights.”);
Stevens, supra note 25, at 14. 
139.  Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Western States’ Public Trust
Doctrines: Public Values, Private Rights, and the Evolution Toward an Ecological Public 
Trust, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 53, 56 (2010) (“A state’s public trust doctrine outlines public and 
private rights in water and submerged lands by delineating five components of those rights: 
(1) the beds and banks of waters that are subject to state/public ownership; (2) the line or 
lines dividing private from public title in those submerged lands; (3) the waters subject to
public use rights; (4) the line or lines in those waters that mark the limit of public use 
rights; and (5) the public uses that the doctrine will protect in the waters where the public 
has use rights.”); O’Dea, supra note 126, at 440. 
140. CAL. WATER CODE § 85023 (West Supp. 2016) (“The longstanding constitutional 
principle of reasonable use and the public trust doctrine shall be the foundation of state 
water management policy and are particularly important and applicable to the Delta.”).
For more information about the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta, see About the California
Delta, DELTA BOATING, http://deltaboating.com/about.htm [https://perma.cc/5DDD-NC2B] 
(last visited Nov. 11, 2016), and California’s Water: Sacramento-San Joaquin River 
Delta, ASS’N OF CAL. WATER AGENCIES, http://www.acwa.com/content/delta/californias-
water-sacramento-san-joaquin-river-delta-0 [https://perma.cc/V674-FBH9] (last visited
Nov. 11, 2016) (“Just a few miles south of Sacramento, two of California’s major rivers 
converge to form one of the most important features of California’s water system—the 
Sacramento-San Joaquin River Delta.”).
141. Stevens, supra note 25, at 6 (“Thus, California’s highest court held, all such
uses are subject to the state’s continuing duty of supervision and may be modified when
changing circumstances call for it under the doctrines of reasonable use and public trust.”); see
CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2 (explaining the rule of reasonable use in California water law); 
State Water Resources Control Board May Weigh the Use of Water for Public Purposes
Against Commercial Use by Riparian Users and Early Appropriators in Determining














     





    





      
    
 










   
 
     
 
 
The public trust doctrine recognizes the state as the trustee of natural
resources that should be managed for public benefit, and thus in theory it
provides a defense to takings claims regarding property held in public trust.142 
All water is property of the people of the state, subject to appropriation.143 
Property rights in water generally only confer the right to use and not own 
water, “subject to the limits imposed by California’s Constitution, statute[s],
and the public trust doctrine.”144  The doctrine assigns the government the
role of trustee, meaning it holds the resources, like land under navigable
water, in trust for the real owner, which is the public at large.145  The public 
trust doctrine could be expanded in California to validate the governmental 
taking of private property, or water rights in this situation.
2. National Audubon and Beyond 
California’s public trust doctrine and the Board and California’s state 
courts’ roles in protecting public trust resources were firmly established 
and-early-appropriators/ [https://perma.cc/SC88-JBCX] (“[I]t has long been accepted that 
California law requires that water be put to a use that is both beneficial and reasonable . . . .  
[T]he public trust is a . . .  potential limit on private uses of water.” (citing Light v. State 
Water Res. Control Bd., 173 Cal. Rptr. 3d 200, 211–12 (2014))). 
142. O’Dea, supra note 126, at 439 (“Theoretically, the public trust doctrine provides a
defense to taking claims involving property held in the public trust.”).  For a discussion of the
public trust resources during the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA)
environmental review process, see Patricia Nelson, CEQA and the Public Trust Doctrine:
A Citizen’s Guide, ENVTL. FORUM OF MARIN CLASS 40, at 5 (2013), http://www.marinefm. 
org/assets/images/Stories/public%20trust%20guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/2FM3-Z4F2].
143. CAL. WATER CODE § 102 (West 2009) (“All water within the State is the property
of the people of the State, but the right to the use of water may be acquired by appropriation
in the manner provided by law.”). 
144. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 719 (Cal. 1983) (noting
that one of the purposes of the public trust doctrine is to protect both “recreational and
ecological” values); Stevens, supra note 25, at 6 (“Although property rights can exist in 
water, they are commonly described as usufructory; in other words they only confer the 
right to the use of water, subject to strict limits imposed by the State Constitution, statute,
and the public trust doctrine.” (first citing WATER § 102; and then citing Eddy v. Simpson,
3 Cal. 249, 252 (1853))).  For a discussion of protected uses under the public trust doctrine, 
see Protected Uses, FLOW, http://flowforwater.org/public-trust-solutions/protected-uses/
[https://perma.cc/9QGL-3CSL] (last visited Nov. 11, 2016). 
145. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892) (“That the State 
holds the title to the lands under the navigable waters of Lake Michigan, within its limits, 
in the same manner that the State holds title to soil under tide water, by the common law, 
we have already shown . . . .”); Erin Ryan, The Public Trust Doctrine, Private Water
Allocation, and Mono Lake: The Historic Saga of National Audubon Society v. Superior
Court, 45 ENVTL. L. 561, 568 (2015) (“The State holds the title to the lands under the 
navigable waters . . . in trust for the people of the state that they may enjoy the navigation
of the waters, carry on commerce over them, and have liberty of fishing therein freed from 
the obstruction or interference of private parties.” (quoting Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 146
U.S. at 452)).
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in National Audubon v. Superior Court.146  The legal history that arose
with the developments of Mono Lake embodies the conflicting interests 
that arise in public trust doctrine issues.147 
In National Audubon Society v. Superior Court, the National Audubon
Society and Mono Lake Committee argued that Los Angeles’s water 
diversions from Mono Lake “violated the public trust doctrine, constituted
a common law nuisance, and violated portions of the California Constitution
protecting navigable waterways.”148  Petitioners sought an injunction to
permanently force the Department of Water and Power of the City of Los 
Angeles (DWP) to reduce its water diversions from Mono Lake, asserting
that it was protected by the public trust.149  Petitioners requested a review
of the superior court’s decision, which was that the public trust doctrine 
offered “no independent basis” for DWP diversions, and plaintiffs had 
failed to exhaust administrative remedies before the Water Board prior to 
filing suit.150  The California Supreme Court held that both the public trust
 146. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d at 721 (“We conclude that the public trust 
doctrine, as recognized and developed in California decisions, protects navigable waters 
from harm caused by diversion of nonnavigable tributaries.”). 
147. Ryan, supra note 145, at 603 (“The emerging coalition marshalled its resources
to forestall further environmental devastation in Mono Basin, culminating in the California 
Supreme Court’s epic Mono Lake decision.”). For more information about Mono Lake, 
see The Mono Lake Story, MONO LAKE COMM., http://www.monolake.org/about/story
[https://perma.cc/T8AZ-277F] (last visited Nov. 11, 2016) (“Since 1978, the Committee 
has achieved many accomplishments in the fight to protect Mono Lake.”).
148. CAL. CONST. art X, § 4 (“No individual, partnership, or corporation . . . shall be
permitted to exclude the right of way to such [navigable] water whenever it is required for 
any public purpose, nor to destroy or obstruct the free navigation of such water.”); Ryan,
supra note 145, at 603. 
149. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d at 719, 721 (“Mono Lake is a navigable
waterway . . . We conclude that the public trust doctrine, as recognized and developed in
California decisions, protects navigable waters from harm caused by diversion of
nonnavigable tributaries.”); see also George Leef, Thanks, EPA: Your New ‘Navigable 
Waters’ Rule Strengthens the Case Against Administrative Law, FORBES (Feb. 6, 2015, 
9:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/georgeleef/2015/02/06/thanks-epa-your-new-
navigable-waters-rule-strengthens-the-case-against-administrative-law/2/#1ffafaf3133f 
[https://perma.cc/ANQ9-3SGY] (explaining that although the Supreme Court has limited
the power of water regulators in two cases, “when regulators lose court cases, it does not 
hurt them,” so the EPA and Army Corps proposed a new rule to broadly define “navigable 
waters” to expand their authority over them). 
150. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d at 712; see L.A DEP’T OF WATER & POWER, 
https://www.ladwp.com [https://perma.cc/WG3W-8GMU] (last visited Nov. 11, 2016)
(providing more information on DWP); see also LADWP (@LADWP), TWITTER (Mar. 5,
2016, 8:10 PM), https://twitter.com/LADWP/status/706331031666876416 [https://twitter
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doctrine and the law of appropriative water rights are fundamental and
equal, although conflicting, principles in California water law.151 The court 
concluded that the public trust doctrine can forbid diversions of non-
navigable tributaries that damage the public interest of navigable waterways.152 
The court did not, however, order a particular allocation of water.153 
Notably, the court determined that the public trust doctrine and the 
California water rights system operate together in one integrated system
of water law.154  The state has supervisory control over its navigable waters
and the lands beneath those waters, while the Legislature acting through
an agency like the State Water Board simultaneously has the right to 
permit water appropriations.155  However, “once the state has approved 
an appropriation, the public trust imposes a duty of continuing supervision
over the taking and use of the appropriated water,” and the state can reconsider 
allocation decisions that negatively affect the public trust.156 National 
.com/LADWP/status/706331031666876416] (“How can you save 2.5 gals of water per
minute? Turn off water while brushing teeth.”). 
151. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d at 719 (noting that traditional public rights in 
using public trust navigable waters does not limit the public interest in the trust, where
public uses are flexible to encompass changing public needs); see Ryan, supra note 145,
at 608 (“Instead, [the California Supreme Court] affirmed that both doctrines remain 
bedrock principles within California law, and that neither displaces the other.” (citing Nat’l 
Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d at 718)). 
152. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d at 732. 
153. Id.; see City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 5 P.3d 853, 869 (Cal. 2000) 
(explaining that a court adjudicating a water rights dispute may “impose a physical solution to
achieve a practical allocation of water to competing interests,” and therefore the court 
could have ordered a particular allocation of water in National Audubon); see Ed Owens,
Public Trust Doctrine, NAT’L RES. PROTECTIVE ASS’N (2001), http://www.nrpa.com/
resources/public-trust-doctrine/ [https://perma.cc/ZA6G-5B68] (explaining the history
of the public trust doctrine, and which natural resources are protected by the public trust); 
see also Ryan, supra note 145, at 609 (“[T]he Mono Lake case is perhaps most famous for 
the proposition that the public trust doctrine protects values beyond the traditional boating,
fishing, and swimming associated with navigable waters to also include ecological,
recreational, and scenic considerations.” (citations omitted)).
154. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d at 726–27 (“As we have seen, the public trust 
doctrine and the appropriative water rights system administered by the Water Board developed 
independently of each other.”); see also Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Adaptive Water 
Law, 62 KAN. L. REV. 1043, 1081 (2014) (“Integrated water governance enhances institutional, 
social, and ecological adaptive capacity by organizing around the interconnections
in ecosystem-social legal-system dynamics.”). 
155. See Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d at 727 (“The state as sovereign retains continuing
supervisory control over its navigable water and the lands beneath those waters . . . . [While] 
the Legislature, acting directly or through an authorized agency such as the Water Board, 
has the power to grant usufructuary licenses that will permit an appropriator to take water
from flowing streams . . . .” (citations omitted)).
156. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d at 721, 728 (holding further that an individual 
who acquires rights in the public trust holds those rights “subject to the trust, and can assert
no vested right to use those rights in a manner harmful to the trust”).  For another example 
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Audubon is thus significant because the State Water Board must now
affirmatively consider the impact of water diversions on public trust resources 
when it grants and oversees the exercise of water rights, and it must ultimately
protect public trust resources.157  Because the state has the power to increase
“continued supervision over the [public] trust,” the state can claim that the 
public trust is in danger under the current system of water rights appropriations,
and water rights must be given back to the state to protect the public trust.158 
The decision in National Audubon was a step in the right direction, but 
nothing comparable has happened since.159  The State Water Board must 
reevaluate the public trust values in the Mono Basin before it decides whether 
or not Los Angeles’s water permits have a valid public interest, but the court
did not specify how to balance the competing interests.160  The State Water 
Board must reconcile the public trust with prior water appropriations, and
the best solution is to use the public trust doctrine as a justification for
revoking private water rights through appropriations, senior water rights, 
and other water rights.  Now that California has faced a persistent drought 
for the past several years, it is time that the Board revisit the current plans
for water diversions from public trusts like Mono Lake and other areas.
of a public trust resource besides Mono Lake, see SCOTT RIVER WATER TR., http://www.
scottwatertrust.org/ [https://perma.cc/P6CZ-PXFW] (last visited Nov. 11, 2016). 
157. O’Dea, supra note 126, at 441–42 (“The court held that as administrator of the 
public trust, the state has power to exercise ‘continued supervision over the trust.’” 
(quoting Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d at 721)).
158. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d at 721, 723; O’Dea, supra note 126, at 442
(“The Board’s ‘continuing supervision’ over water rights gives the Board broad authority
to ‘reconsider allocation decisions,’ even if it has previously considered the public trust
impacts of those allocations.” (quoting Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 628 P.2d at 728–29)).
159. It is true that Illinois Central helped develop the public trust doctrine in 
common law, but it is not as recognized as National Audubon, and more action (like both
of these cases) should occur.  Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892); Ryan, 
supra note 145, at 572 (“Following the Mono Lake decision, [Illinois Central] has become 
increasingly associated not only with the protection of such traditional uses as boating,
commerce, fishing, and swimming, but with environmental protection as well.” (citing
Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971))); see Restoration Chronology, MONO 
LAKE COMM., http://www.monolake.org/mlc/restochr [https://perma.cc/7W37-VL53] (last
visited Nov. 11, 2016) (explaining the projects and actions taken in Mono Lake’s restoration
from 1982 until 2009). 
160. See Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. 387; Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d 709; 
see also Ryan, supra note 145, at 565, 634. 
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Also, case law suggests that the state government is the only entity that 
can use the public trust doctrine as a defense to taking claims.161  For
example, in United States v. SWRCB, the court of appeal held that National 
Audubon v. Superior Court “firmly establishes” the right of the Board to
control water rights permits and reevaluate permits as necessary.162  In this
case, the court affirmed the Board’s power to exercise supervision over 
water rights holders where the end goal was to protect fish and wildlife.163 
In another case, Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District v. United States, 
the court held that the public trust doctrine did not apply to the federal 
government’s use, because this judgment is reserved for the state.164 
Therefore, only either the Board or a state court, not a federal agency or 
federal court, can use the public trust doctrine as a defense to water taking
claims.165  The public trust doctrine would therefore provide a solid defense
for the Board should water takings claims arise if the proposal at hand 
were to be enacted.166  The Board would be protected, because water is a
161. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 323– 
24 (2001); Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d 728 (“[T]he state must bear in mind its duty as 
trustee to consider the effect of the taking on the public trust.”); United States v. State 
Water Res. Control Bd., 227 Cal. Rptr. 161, 201 (Ct. App. 1986) (“This landmark decision
directly refutes the Bureau’s contentions and firmly establishes that the state, acting
through the Board, has continuing jurisdiction over appropriation permits and is free to 
reexamine a previous allocation decision.”); see O’Dea, supra note 126, at 439. 
162. State Water Res. Control Bd., 227 Cal. Rptr. at 201 (“[T]he board unquestionably
possesses legal authority over the public trust doctrine to exercise supervision over [water 
rights holders] in order to protect fish and wildlife . . . .”). 
163. Id.  For more information on protecting California’s fish and wildlife resources 
during the current drought, see Drought Related Actions to Preserve and Protect the State’s
Fish and Wildlife Resources, CAL. DEP’T OF FISH & WILDLIFE, https://www.wildlife.ca.gov/ 
drought [https://perma.cc/A4MA-99SG] (last visited Nov. 11, 2016). 
164. See Tulare Lake Basin, 49 Fed. Cl. at 323–24. But see Cynthia Carlson, Federal 
Property and the Preemption of State Public Trust Doctrines, 20 E.L.R. 10003 (1990)
(discussing the federal government’s power to preempt the state public trust doctrine where
federal property is involved). 
165. O’Dea, supra note 126, at 445 (“Thus, according to the court, for the public 
trust doctrine to provide a defense to water takings claims, the SWRCB or a state court—
as opposed to a federal agency or a federal court—must do the readjusting.”); see Jeremy
P. Jacobs, Takings Arguments Bubble Up as California Cuts Water Rights, GREENWIRE (July
27, 2015), http://www.eenews.net/stories/1060022451 [https://perma.cc/RR8F-ZNQ5]
(explaining the conflict between the Fifth Amendment’s taking clause and the state taking
back water rights during the drought). 
166. See O’Dea, supra note 126, at 445 (noting that only a state agency or a state
court, not a federal agency or a federal court, can use the public trust doctrine as a defense 
in this context); see also Michael C. Blumm & Lucus Ritchie, Lucas’s Unlikely Legacy: 
The Rise of Background Principles as Categorical Takings Defenses, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 321, 322 (2005) (“Lucas instead spawned a surprising rise of categorical defenses to 
takings claims in which governments can defeat compensation suits without case-specific 
inquiries into the economic effects and public purposes of regulations.”). 
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public trust resource in California and when it regulates water distribution 
and reevaluates water permits, it is acting in the interest of the public.167 
3. A Lack of Property Rights in Water Under the Public Trust 
Doctrine Justifies Taking Water Rights 
The state can construe its regulatory power to take control of private 
water use rights and use the public trust doctrine as a defense to taking 
these private rights, claiming there were no existing private property
rights in the water use rights.168  This would reinforce the public trust doctrine, 
where the state has a duty to preserve this trust property from harmful
diversions by water rights holders,” and would redirect water to areas that 
need water the most.169  The public trust doctrine should be expanded so
that the State Water Board can take control over all water distribution that 
private water rights holders control now, as well as navigable waters that 
are included in the public trust.170 
167. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 712 (Cal. 1983); see Norman 
K. Johnson & Charles T. DuMars, A Survey of the Evolution of Western Water Law in
Response to Changing Economic and Public Interest Demands, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 347 
(1989) (discussing the “modern protection of the public interest in the allocation of water 
under the [appropriation] doctrine . . . .”); see O’Dea, supra note 126, at 439. 
168. See Kristen Dorrity, Comment, Will Federal Environmental Regulation Be 
Permitted to Infringe on State Vested Water Rights?, 11 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 113, 
124 (1992) (“While the state’s ‘uniquely sovereign’ interests in water could conceivably
allow unbridled state regulation of water rights without effecting a taking, different issues 
arise where federal regulations result in similar restrictions of water rights.”).
169. United States v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 227 Cal. Rptr. 161, 170–71 (Ct. 
App. 1986); see also Julia Lurie, California’s Drought is So Bad That Thousands Are Living 
Without Running Water, MOTHER JONES (July 31, 2015, 6:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.
com/environment/2015/07/drought-5000-californians-dont-have-running-water [https://perma. 
cc/QU36-4YEQ] (“While a handful of communities across the state are dealing with municipal
water contamination and shortages, the area that’s hardest hit—and routinely referred to 
as the ‘ground zero of the drought’—is Tulare County, a rural, agriculture-heavy region in
the Central Valley that’s roughly the size of Connecticut.”).
170. See  CAL. WATER CODE § 85023 (West Supp. 2016) (“The longstanding 
constitutional principle of reasonable use and the public trust doctrine shall be the
foundation of state water management policy and are particularly important and applicable 
to the Delta.”); see Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d at 719 (“It is . . . well settled in the 
United States generally and in California that the public trust is not limited by the reach of
the tides, but encompasses all navigable lakes and streams.” (citations omitted)); see State 
Water Res. Control Bd., 227 Cal. Rptr. at 170–71. 
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Arguably, no private property rights exist in water use rights.171  The 
state can make this argument if its actions are challenged, because water
is originally the state’s property that it can choose to appropriate, or allow
others to use.172 Water is inherently the state’s property and the state has the 
right to reasonably use and appropriate water use.173  With no private property
rights in existence, the state is merely taking direct control of its own
property, which is within the public trust.174  The public trust naturally includes
the state’s waters, and the state controls the public trust, so it is logical that
the state can increase its power to actually produce change, stimulate water
conservation, and better manage water use statewide.175 
As exemplified in National Audubon, California law mandates that the 
public trust doctrine be considered in appropriating private water rights. 
The public trust doctrine conflicts with the prior appropriations doctrine 
of private water allocation.176 Appropriation of water rights affirms private
171. Cynthia L. Koehler, Water Rights and the Public Trust Doctrine: Resolution of
the Mono Lake Controversy, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 541, 555 (1995) (“Rights to water therefore 
fall well short of real property ownership and carry only a right of use.” (citing Eddy v.
Simpson, 3 Cal. 249, 252 (1853))). 
172. CAL. WATER CODE § 102 (West 2009) (“All water within the State is the 
property of the people of the State . . .”).  California law has another related provision, stating:
All water flowing in any natural channel, excepting so far as it has been or is 
being applied to useful and beneficial purposes upon, or in so far as it may be 
reasonably needed for useful and beneficial purposes upon lands riparian thereto, or
otherwise appropriated, is hereby declared to be public water of the State and 
subject to appropriation in accordance with the provisions of this code. 
CAL. WATER CODE § 1201 (West 2009).
173. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2; see O’Dea, supra note 126, at 439 (“In federal ESA
cases, using the public trust as a defense to takings claims presents a problem: case law
suggests that the state government, not the federal government, is the only entity that can 
validly assert the public trust doctrine as a defense.” (citation omitted)). 
174. WATER § 102 (“All water within the State is the property of the people of the 
State.”); WATER § 85023 (“The longstanding constitutional principle of reasonable use and 
the public trust doctrine shall be the foundation of state water management policy and are 
particularly important and applicable to the Delta.”); Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d at 
711, 718; see O’Dea, supra note 126, at 440 (“Case law does not provide definitive 
guidance as to when the federal government can validly assert the public trust defense in
a takings case where the state has not acted.” (citation omitted)).
175. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d at 711, 718. 
176. Symposium, Innovation Within A Regulatory Framework: The Protection of 
Instream Beneficial Uses of Water in California, 1978 to 2004, 36 MCGEORGE L. REV. 
305, 323 (2005) (noting that the California Supreme Court in National Audubon declined 
to find that either the public trust doctrine or the doctrine of prior appropriation supersedes 
the other, and instead “established a series of principles that would accommodate the needs 
of both doctrines”).  For an example of where the public trust doctrine does conflict with 
riparian rights in Rhode Island, see Jose L. Fernandez, Public Trust, Riparian Rights, and
Aquaculture: A Storm Brewing in the Ocean State, 20 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 293, 293 (1996) (“Controversy has been generated by recent decisions of the Rhode
1094
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rights to use water in waterways, where the public trust doctrine affirms 
public rights in waterways, and the two ideas have difficulty coexisting.177 
Taking private appropriated water rights thus expands the public trust’s 
theory that water in the state should belong to the public, and should be 
controlled by the state to determine how much access to grant the public. 
Although the public trust doctrine and the law of appropriative water
rights conflict and both remain fundamental California principles, the 
state has gained power to determine when and how water can be diverted 
to areas when the public trust is affected.178  If the public trust doctrine
were expanded further to include all water in the state—appropriated, 
common, or otherwise—the state would have the power to choose how it 
is diverted.179  The state has a lot of power over water already, so the public
trust doctrine not only defends but also mandates that the state take the 
Island Supreme Court which redefined the relation between riparian owners’ rights and
public rights under the public trust doctrine.”). 
177. Alice King, Comment, The Mono Lake Problem and The Public Trust Solution, 
7 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 67, 89 (1987) (discussing National Audubon Society v. 
Superior Court, and the remaining uncertainty about implementing a water policy that 
“incorporates the public trust doctrine into the riparian and prior appropriation systems”); 
Ryan, supra note 145, at 578 (2015); see also Timothy J. Conway, National Audubon
Society v. Superior Court: The Expanding Public Trust Doctrine, 14 ENVTL. L. 617, 630, 
634 (1984) (“[O]nce an appropriation is approved, the state has a duty of continuing 
supervision . . . . Thus, this integrated system allows for a continual reevaluation of water
uses in order to meet the public’s changing needs.”); Craig, supra note 139, at 55 (“One 
of the legal tools that can re-balance private and public trust doctrines in the state is that
state’s public trust doctrine.”); Jan S. Stevens, The Public Trust and In-Stream Uses, 19
ENVTL. L. 605, 612–14 (1989). 
178. Ryan, supra note 145, at 608; see Know Your Water Rights, STATE WATER RES.
CONTROL BD., http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/water_issues/programs/enforcement/docs/cannabis_ 
enfrcmnt/know_your_water_rights.pdf [https://perma.cc/4MBT-S436] (last visited Nov. 
11, 2016) (explaining how the State requires people diverting water to file a Statement of
Diversion and Use, the failure of which results in a fine, and the State Water Board must
consider public trust resources when allocating water rights); see, e.g., Stevens, supra note 
61 (discussing how the State Water Board can fine water rights holders for violating 
curtailment regulations).
179. Ryan, supra note 145, at 608 (“Water allocation and permitting laws govern the 
established legal relationships in these circumstances in ways that cannot be casually
disrupted.”); id. (“In a decision affirming that instream values are considered beneficial 
uses in California, the court nevertheless allowed that there may be times when the public 
interests in diversions outweigh the public values protected by the trust.” (citing Nat’l 
Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d at 712, 726–27)). 
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public trust into account and take control over water management in the 
state.180 
One drawback in using the public trust doctrine as a legal justification 
is that expansive use of the public trust doctrine could result in the confiscation 
of what many people view as private property rights.181 However, as noted
above, the state’s argument in this case is that private water use rights do 
not equate to actual property rights, but rather the right to use water.182 
Therefore, no private rights are truly confiscated, only the right to use water 
is heavily regulated for the benefit of the state.  Also, courts emphasize the
public trust doctrine’s flexibility to adapt to changing public needs.183 The
State’s direct control of waterways is more beneficial than having private
rights to water, because private users will still be allocated water, but the state
would have the regulatory authority to manage water resources responsibly. 
This is necessary, especially now in times of water shortages and continued 
land development, where water must be managed across the state.
 180. CAL. WATER CODE § 85023 (West Supp. 2016) (“The longstanding constitutional 
principle of reasonable use and the public trust doctrine shall be the foundation of state 
water management policy.”); see Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d 709; Ryan, supra note 
145, at 608 (“The court thus affirmed that Southern California’s legitimate water needs 
must remain protected by appropriations law, but also that these rights are nonvested, and
subject to the state’s ongoing duty to supervise the impact of diversions on the navigational 
and environmental values associated with trust resources.”).
181. See J. CRAIG GREEN, INDEPENDENCE INST., IP-8-2012, DON’T ASK THE STATE TO
CONFISCATE WATER RIGHTS 1 (June 2012), https://www.i2i.org/files/2012/06/IP_8_2012 
_a.pdf [https://perma.cc/HE5B-ZSU6] (discussing a “poorly-conceived” proposed initiative
in Colorado that would impose the public trust doctrine to “destroy property and contract 
rights in water”); Ryan, supra note 145, at 618. 
182. Stevens, supra note 25, at 6 (“Although property rights can exist in water, they
are commonly described as usufructory; in other words, they only confer the right to the 
use of water, subject to strict limits imposed by the State Constitution, statute, and the
public trust doctrine.”). 
183. See, e.g., Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d at 712 (expanding the public trust doctrine);
Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971) (noting that it is not necessary to 
precisely define every public use that could burden water and land in the public trust and 
a state can later determine lands no longer useful for trust purposes and release them from 
the public trust); Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm’n, 215 N.E.2d 114, 121–26 (Mass.
1966) (noting that the public trust doctrine applies to forested lands in a state park); see 
also QuickFacts California Population, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/
quickfacts/table/PST045215/06# [https://perma.cc/RAK3-JT3Q] (last visited Nov. 11, 2016)
(explaining that California is the most populous state in the nation, with the population
steadily increasing); Richard M. Frank, Another Inconvenient Truth: California Water Law
Must Change, S.F. CHRON. (Apr. 10, 2015), http://www.sfchronicle.com/opinion/article/ 
Another-inconvenient-truth-California-water-law-6192703.php [https://perma.cc/HHR2-
A4T8] (“If we are to survive the drought with the state’s economy and environment intact, 
we need to reform California water rights laws—and soon.”). 
1096
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Eminent domain is another legal justification for taking water use rights 
from private users, and would be most effective if courts insist that water
rights are equivalent to private property rights.
1. Eminent Domain Arises Under the Fifth Amendment 
The concept of eminent domain originates in both the United States
Constitution and California’s Constitution.184  The Fifth Amendment, in 
relevant part, states: “No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken 
for public use, without just compensation.”185  Under California’s Constitution,
“private property may be taken or damaged for a public use and only when 
just compensation, ascertained by a jury unless waived, has first been paid 
to, or into court for, the owner.”186  This is California’s doctrine of eminent
domain, in which the government can take private property if it provides 
the owner with compensation.187 
2. From Kelo v. City of New London to the Rational Basis Test
The United States Supreme Court articulated its view of the eminent 
domain doctrine in Kelo v. City of New London, in which the Connecticut
city proposed a development plan where the city could use the power of 
eminent domain to acquire any remaining or outstanding necessary private
 184. U.S. CONST. amend. V; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19(a); see also COLO. CONST., art. II
§§ 14, 15.
185. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also Emily L. Madueno, Note & Comment, The Fifth
Amendment’s Takings Clause: Public Use and Private Use; Unfortunately, There is No
Difference, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 809, 810 (2007) (“The proper scope of a narrow public 
use definition requires actual use by the general public or public control of the private use; 
otherwise, the public use requirement ceases to restrict any taking.”).
186. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19(a).
187. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19(a); see Rick Rayl, Update on Two Recent California 
Eminent Domain Cases, NOSSAMAN, LLP (Apr. 21, 2015), http://www.californiaeminent 
domainreport.com/2015/04/articles/inverse-condemnation-regulatory-takings/update-on-
two-recent-california-eminent-domain-cases/ [https://perma.cc/CB6V-GDF6] (discussing 
two recent eminent domain cases in California, one of which allowed Casitas to proceed
with its eminent domain action, and the other held that Santa Barbara could not preclude
citizens from building in an area that may be unsafe).
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property from “unwilling owners” in exchange for just compensation.188 
The court determined that the city’s proposed condemnations for economic 
development were for a “public use” within the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment.189  Therefore, the Supreme Court approves of cities, and thus
states, using the power of eminent domain to take private property for public
190use.
This concept of the state taking property through eminent domain is by 
no means unprecedented.  In Mt. Vernon-Woodberry Cotton Duck Co. v. 
Alabama Interstate Power Co., the State of Alabama initiated eminent domain
proceedings to take land, water, and water rights so a power company could 
create and sell hydroelectric power.191  The Supreme Court held that there
was a valid public use in the government taking to “save mankind from 
toil that it can be spared,” and the Court noted some limitations in requiring 
“explicit public use” for eminent domain takings.192  The Court thus expanded
the definition of public use.193 
188. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 472, 477 (2005); see also Bob 
Adelmann, Eminent Domain in Connecticut: Homeowners Fight to Keep Homes, NEW 
AM. (Sept. 17, 2015), http://www.thenewamerican.com/usnews/constitution/item/21599-
eminent-domain-in-connecticut-homeowners-fight-to-keep-homes [https://perma.cc/
F3Z2-U2LU] (discussing more recent events that may lead to an eminent domain lawsuit 
in Connecticut and how it relates to Kelo v. City of New London).
189. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 490; see also Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 
245 (1984) (“A purely private taking could not withstand the scrutiny of the public use 
requirement; it would serve no legitimate purpose of government and would thus be void.”).
But see Kelo, 545 U.S. at 498 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“But ‘public ownership’ and
‘use-by-the-public’ are sometimes too constricting and impractical ways to define the
scope of the Public Use Clause.”).
190. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see generally Kelo, 545 U.S. 469 (finding Connecticut 
could use the power of eminent domain to acquire private property from “unwilling owners” in
exchange for just compensation).
191. Mt. Vernon-Woodberry Cotton Duck Co. v. Alabama Interstate Power Co., 240 
U.S. 30, 31 (1916); see Steven Chen, Note, Keeping Public Use Relevant in Stadium Eminent 
Domain Takings: The Massachusetts Way, 40 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 453, 458 (2013) 
(“As technology advanced and corporations began to grow increasingly complex, however, 
governments began using their eminent domain powers to assist private firms.” (citing 
William A. Fischel, The Political Economy of Public Use in Poletown: How Federal Grants 
Encourage Excessive Use of Eminent Domain, 2004 MICH. ST.L.REV. 929, 933 (2004)))); see 
also Explore Our Plants, ALA.POWER, http://www.alabamapower.com/about-us/plants/ home.asp 
[https://perma.cc/KW8G-YMB7] (last visited Nov. 11, 2016) (providing locations of hydroelectric 
generating power plants in Alabama). 
192. Mt. Vernon-Woodberry Cotton Duck Co., 240 U.S. at 32 (1916); Chen, supra
note 191 (“The Court held that even though the taking benefitted a private party, it also 
had a public purpose to ‘save mankind from toil that it can be spared’ and acknowledged
the limitations of requiring explicit public use for eminent domain takings.” (citation omitted)). 
193. Chen, supra note 191 (“As the Court expanded the definition of public use, it 
also began showing greater deference to legislatures exercising their eminent domain 
powers.” (citations omitted)); see Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 29 (1954) (“[The public
use includes] the acquisition and the assembly of real property and the leasing or sale thereof
1098
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However, in 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redevelopment Agency, 
a California district court held that the rational basis test precluded the
City of Lancaster from using eminent domain to take private property, and 
that “future blight” is not a “conceivable” public purpose.194  Under the
rational basis test, a taking is justified when the taking is rationally related
to a valid, conceivable public use.195  Here, 99 Cents Only Stores (99 Cents)
argued that the Lancaster Redevelopment Agency and the City of Lancaster
(Lancaster) threatened to take its property in violation of the Fifth
Amendment.196 99 Cents requested the court enjoin Lancaster from initiating 
condemnation proceedings against it because such condemnation would
violate the public use provision of the Takings Clause in the Fifth
Amendment.197  The court enjoined Lancaster from initiating eminent domain
proceedings against 99 Cents, holding that Lancaster’s theory that the land 
must be condemned to protect against future blight fails, and Lancaster
was actually attempting to condemn 99 Cents’ leasehold interest only to 
for redevelopment pursuant to a project area redevelopment plan . . . .” (citation omitted));
see United States v. 14.02 Acres of Land, 547 F.3d 943, 949, 952 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding 
that a project that was the partnership between private and public entities satisfied public 
use for a taking); see Rosenthal & Rosenthal Inc. v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 771 
F.2d 44, 45 (2d Cir. 1985) (noting that redevelopment of a blighted area satisfied the public 
use requirement).
194. 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redevelopment Agency, 237 F. Supp. 2d
1123, 1126–28, 1128, 1130 (C.D. Cal. 2001). But see Wendell E. Pritchett, The “Public
Menace” of Blight: Urban Renewal and the Private Uses of Eminent Domain, 21 YALE L.
& POL’Y REV. 1, 3 (2003) (discussing that Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954), held that 
condemnations were constitutional, because “[b]y elevating blight, [a disease that threatened to
turn healthy areas into slums,] into a disease that would destroy the city, renewal advocates 
broadened the application of the Public Use Clause and at the same time brought about a 
reconceptualization of property rights.”). 
195. 99 Cents Only Stores, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 1129 (“To satisfy the Public Use Clause, a
taking need only be ‘rationally related to a conceivable public purpose.’” (quoting Hawaii 
Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984))). 
196. U.S. CONST. amend. V; 99 Cents Only Stores, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 1125; see also 
Successor Agency, LANCASTER, http://www.cityoflancasterca.org/about-us/city-government/ 
redevelopment-agency [https://perma.cc/N4T6-YBZK] (last visited Nov. 11, 2016) (explaining
that the Redevelopment Agency referenced in 99 Cents Only Stores was recently dissolved
and replaced by the Successor Agency).
197. 99 Cents Only Stores, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 1125; see Dan Nephin, With Bulova
Building Agreement, Lancaster No Longer Pursuing Eminent Domain, LANCASTER ONLINE
(July 23, 2015), http://lancasteronline.com/news/local/with-bulova-building-agreement-
lancaster-no-longer-pursuing-eminent-domain/article_9f2726fc-3081-11e5-aa85-7facb5d 
705e5.html [https://perma.cc/RR7U-5FUC] (discussing another eminent domain action that
almost, but did not, occur in Lancaster).
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appease a third party who wanted 99 Cents’ land.198  This is an unconstitutional
taking for private purposes.199 
The rational basis test referenced in 99 Cents Only Stores would not
preclude the state from obtaining water rights in California.200  There is a 
valid and rational public use in the government taking of all water rights, 
because the state legislature could control water management and better
delegate water management powers, and subsequently control over land
development would stem from one entity.201  This is rational, because the
public has not been successful in managing water thus far, and the state
legislature may have to step in anyway to get water management on track.202 
Eminent domain is one possible vehicle for the state legislature to achieve
the rational public purpose of equal water distribution, and eventually
sustainable land development, to solve California’s problem of continued 
land development when water is scarce and mismanaged. 
3. Eminent Domain Justifies Taking Private Water Rights, 
Subject to Constitutional Limitations
It is logical that the state can take back its property—water rights—through
eminent domain if the state can prove a public use, and if it provides “just 
compensation,” assuming that courts will treat water rights in this scenario
 198. 99 Cents Only Stores, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 1131. 
199. Id. at 1130.  For an example of a different kind of unconstitutional taking, see 
LaVonda N. Reed-Huff, Are You Still Settling for Cable? A Case for Broader Application
of the FCC’s Over-The-Air Reception Devices Rule, 26 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 179, 
185 (2004) (“The FCC struck the proper constitutional balance between the interests of
consumers, property owners, and the business industry by not extending the Rule to common 
areas, as such an extension probably would constitute an unconstitutional taking.”). 
200. 99 Cents Only Stores, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 1129 (“To satisfy the Public Use 
Clause, a taking need only be ‘rationally related to a conceivable public purpose.’” (citing
Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241)); Rational Basis, CORNELL UNIV. LAW SCH., https://www.law.
cornell.edu/wex/rational_basis [https://perma.cc/4B79-JN2B] (last visited Nov. 11, 2016)
(“Rational basis review is a test used in some contexts to determine a law’s constitutionality.”).
201. Mt. Vernon-Woodberry Cotton Duck Co. v. Alabama Interstate Power Co., 240 
U.S. 30, 30, 33 (1916) (holding that a power company could legally condemn a private 
company’s land, water, and water rights for a valid public use purpose); Chen, supra note 
191, at 457–58 (noting that the United States Supreme Court does not itself determine the 
public use, and the Court broadly defines public use and defers to legislative findings on
the definition of public use). 
202. Ian Lovett, In California, Stingy Water Users are Fined in Drought While the 
Rich Soak, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2015, at A22 (providing examples of individuals who
have cut down on their water use but still receive water surplus charges, while individuals 
in other cities like Bel Air use more water but receive no fines).  Interestingly, this exemplifies
how the state is attempting to control water use, but is creating some inequalities. Id.  The
State would be better equipped to control water use and management if it had control over
the source, and how water is dispersed from the start. Id. 
1100
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as private property rights.203  According to California law, “all water within
the State is the property of the people of the State.”204  Therefore, the state has
property rights over all water within the state unless it chooses to appropriate 
the water to other rights holders.205  California’s legislature should use its
eminent domain power to take property rights from private water rights
holders to merge and strengthen efficiency within the system of water 
distribution.206  For example, the state could thus use eminent domain as
a justification to take water rights from senior water rights holders and
appropriators who are not using their permits in a sustainable manner.207 
Then the state would have direct control over all future water allocation 
and distribution, and impose higher standards on cities—such as the standard
 203. U.S.CONST. amend. V; CAL.CONST. art. I, § 19(a); see Kelo v. City of New London, 
545 U.S. 469 (2005); Katrina Miriam Wyman, The Measures of Just Compensation, 41 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 239, 252 (2007) (“The Supreme Court has indicated that the purpose 
of paying just compensation is to make the takee ‘whole,’ and that this will usually be 
accomplished by paying fair market value.” (first citing United States v. 564.54 Acres of
Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511 (1979); and then citing United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water
Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 81 (1913))); Just Compensation in Eminent Domain, BIERSDORF 
& ASSOCS., http://www.condemnation-law.com/blog/just-compensation-in-eminent-domain/
[https://perma.cc/4LDX-3UDY] (last visited Nov. 11, 2016) (explaining that when the
government determines just compensation in eminent domain proceedings, it hires an
appraiser to determine the value of the land, its features, and severance damages, and
the government must also consider the highest and best use for the land); Just Compensation, 
INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/j/just-compensation.asp [https://perma.cc/
Z4CX-55H6] (last visited Nov. 11, 2016) (“The just compensation remedy is provided by
the Fifth Amendment’s taking clause, and is usually considered to be fair market value.”).
204. CAL. WATER CODE § 102 (West 2009); see Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. All Parties, 
306 P.2d 824, 839 (Cal. 1957) (“We are therefore here directly concerned with the title, 
distribution and use of water which has not heretofore been subjected to beneficial use
except as contemplated by acquisition, by appropriation or otherwise on the part of the 
State of California and the United States.”), rev’d on other grounds, Ivanhoe Irrigation 
Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275 (1958). 
205. WATER § 102; see  CAL. WATER CODE § 1486(b) (West Supp. 2016) (“Upon 
application for a permit to appropriate water pursuant to subdivision (a), the board may
grant the permit subject to the terms and conditions as in the board’s judgment are necessary
for the protection of the rights of any legal user of the water.”). 
206. Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist., 306 P.2d at 869 (Gibson, C.J., dissenting) (stating that 
riparian rights are property rights which vest in the owner and are protected by state and 
federal Constitutions and can be limited or impaired without due process and just compensation);
see also Jurupa Ditch Co. v. County of San Bernardino, 63 Cal. Rptr. 764, 769–70 (Ct. App.
1967).
207. CAL. WATER CODE § 1240 (West 2009) (“The appropriation must be for some 
useful or beneficial purpose, and when the appropriator or his successor in interest ceases
to use it for such a purpose the right ceases.”).
1101
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form general plans discussed below—to ensure efficient land development 
and water consumption.208 
While justifying taking private water rights through eminent domain
could be successful, using this doctrine also poses several problems, because
the doctrine is constitutionally limited, proving a valid public use may be 
difficult, and this would be an expensive solution, not to mention the public 
backlash that would inevitably arise.  First, both the California State Constitution
and the Federal Constitution limit the use of eminent domain.209  That creates
an additional hurdle, because if the state’s actions are challenged in court, 
it may have to prove to both federal and state courts that the “taking” of water
rights was proper.210  Second, the state must prove that it took the water 
rights for a valid public use.211  Courts would likely find a valid public use 
should the state take water rights from private users, because the water
would still be used by the public, just in a more efficient manner so areas 
that need more water will receive more water, and water will not be used 
208. See infra Part III (b); see generally  PAULA VAN LARE & DANIELLE ARIGONI,
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, GROWING TOWARD MORE EFFICIENT WATER USE: LINKING
DEVELOPMENT, INFRASTRUCTURE, AND DRINKING WATER POLICIES 12 (2006), http://www.
epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-01/documents/growing_water_use_efficiency.pdf [https://
perma.cc/V4DD-GQMQ] (explaining that how a community grows affects its water use 
and the cost of water, and how water policies can affect growth).
209. U.S. CONST. amend. V; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19(a); see also Charles Gray, Comment,
Keeping the Home Team at Home, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1329, 1334 (1986) (“In addition to
these Federal Constitutional limitations, state constitutions may restrict the use of eminent
domain.”); id. (“California, for example, adds procedural requirements to the basic fifth
amendment commands.” (citations omitted)).
210. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 472 (2005); People ex rel. Dep’t Pub.
Works v. Chevalier, 340 P.2d 598, 601 (Cal. 1959) (explaining that the question of whether
a taking is for a proper public use under the eminent domain provisions of the U.S. Constitution
and California Constitution is a justiciable issue); see Johnston v. Sonoma Cnty. Agric. 
Pres. & Open Space Dist., 123 Cal. Rptr. 2d 226 (Ct. App. 2002). Using eminent domain 
as a solution requires assuming that water rights are private property rights, which some
courts in California do. See Thayer v. Cal. Dev. Co., 128 P. 21, 24 (Cal. 1912); Lux v. Higgin, 
10 P. 674 (Cal. 1886); Hoffman v. Stone, 7 Cal. 46 (1857); Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140, 146 (Cal.
1855) (“So fully recognized have become these rights, that without any specific legislation 
conferring or confirming them, they are alluded to and spoken of in various acts of the
Legislature in the same manner as if they were rights which had been vested . . . .”); see also
Clifford W. Schulz & Gregory S. Weber, Changing Judicial Attitudes Towards Property Rights
in California Water Resources: From Vested Rights to Utilitarian Reallocations, 19 PAC.
L.J. 1031, 1047 (1988). 
211. U.S. CONST. amend. V; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19(a); Megan M. Herzog & Sean B. 
Hecht, Combatting Sea Level Rise in Southern California: How Local Governments can Seize 
Adaptation Opportunities While Minimizing Legal Risk, 19 HASTINGS W.-N.W.J. ENV. L.
& POL’Y 463, 542 n.447 (2013) (explaining that public streets, highways, sewers, water
tanks, water pipes, transmission of electrical power, and construction of storm drainage
systems are all proper public uses for the purposes of satisfying the eminent domain doctrine).
1102
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for land developments with no sustainable water source.212  Third, the state
must provide “just compensation” to private water rights holders when it takes 
their rights.213 The state would have to pay each private water rights holder
when it takes the water use rights, which can become very expensive.214  These
costs may be especially problematic when taking control of rights from 
senior water rights holders like farmers, who have ancient rights to receive
a large percentage of the state’s water each year.215  Also, senior water rights
holders have already engaged in litigation when the state has curtailed their 
rights for drought purposes, and litigation will only grow if their rights are 
permanently taken.216  This may be impractical for the state.  However, using
eminent domain as a legal justification to increase direct state control could
 212. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see Jeffrey Spivak, A New Competitive Edge: Water 
Management, URBAN LAND MAG. (Sept. 21, 2015), http://urbanland.uli.org/sustainability/
new-competitive-edge-water-management/ [https://perma.cc/D27G-7ALW] (“The drought is
not yet slowing new housing development throughout California, but it is changing how 
some developers approach water use and conservation”). 
213. U.S. CONST. amend. V; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1263.310
(West 1975).
214. Brian Angelo Lee, Just Undercompensation: The Idiosyncratic Premium in Eminent 
Domain, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 593, 594–595 (2013) (“The Supreme Court has elaborated . . .
defining ‘just compensation’ as the taken property’s ‘fair market value,’ and in turn defining
‘fair market value’ as the price that would be agreed to by a willing seller and a willing 
buyer.” (first citing Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934); and then citing United 
States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943))); Wayne Lusvardi & Charles Warren, California’s 
Cap-and-Trade Water Proposal: A Planner’s ‘Market’ (Part I), MASTER RESOURCE (Feb. 20,
2014), https://www.masterresource.org/california-state-energy-issues/california-water-cap-
and-trade-1/ [https://perma.cc/T65S-CDJG] (“For the most part there is no such thing as the ‘fair
market value’ of water in California because water is a [free] socialized public good.”); id. 
(“It is the cost to capture, store, convey, and treat water that translates into what is called
its price.”).
215. Chris Nichols, CA Still Tied to Gold Rush-era Water Rights System, SAN DIEGO 
UNION-TRIB. (Apr. 25, 2015, 5:00 PM), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/2015/
apr/25/sacramento-drought-california-water-right-system/ [https://perma.cc/LNN3-8F6F]
(“California’s water rights structure dates to the Gold Rush era, when miners and later farmers
made claims by posting notices to trees along waterways.”). 
216. Boxall, supra note 32 (describing the litigation accompanying the State Water
Board cutting senior water rights, and noting that there is a “lack of good diversion information,” 
which “raises the question of how the state board can determine what rights to curtail and 
when”); see Gale Courey Toensing, Agua Caliente Water Rights Lawsuit Puts Agencies in Hot 
Water, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA NETWORK (July 17, 2013), http://indiancountrytoday
medianetwork.com/2013/07/17/agua-caliente-water-rights-lawsuit-puts-agencies-hot-water- 
150441 [https://perma.cc/8UXH-AH2V] (“The Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians
has launched a legal battle, based on its aboriginal water rights, for clean water and plenty
of it for its citizens and neighboring communities in the Coachella Valley.”). 
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D. Water Use Regulations: When Water is Not Regarded 
as Private Property 
A third possible justification for the state taking private water use rights 
is that the state could argue it is imposing use regulations on private water 
rights holders, and that water rights are public, not private, property rights. 
Use regulations are limited, however, by the regulatory takings doctrine.217 
1. The Right to Use, Not Own, Water 
Regulatory takings of property by the government are prohibited under 
the California Constitution unless the government pays the owner just 
compensation and affords the owner due process under the law.218  However,
the state could categorize the taking of water rights as a use regulation, 
and claim that there were no private property rights to take, and rather they
were curbing the private use of the state’s property.219  Technically, water
rights are a variety of property rights, but the holders of water rights do
not own the water itself; instead, holders of water rights are authorized to 
divert the water from a source and put it to a beneficial, prudent use.220 In 
217. U.S. CONST., amend. V; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19; see Allegretti & Co. v. County
of Imperial, 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d 122, 130–31 (Ct. App. 2006) (holding that the county’s 
imposition of a permit condition that limited the quantity of groundwater available for the
owner’s use was not a permanent physical occupancy or invasion that would be considered 
a physical “taking”).
218. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19; see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“[N]or shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”); see Craig Anthony
(Tony) Arnold, Proceedings From the Symposium on the Law and Policy of Ecosystem 
Services: The Structure of the Land Use Regulatory System in the United States, 22 J. LAND
USE & ENVTL. L. 441, 449 (2007) (“While constitutional rights and structural provisions 
provide some very broad parameters for land use regulators (mostly local government officials), 
state statutes and provisions in local city codes and charters provide legal parameters that
are more numerous, more frequently applicable, and more constraining than are constitutional
doctrines.”).
219. CAL. WATER CODE § 102 (West 2009) (“All water within the state is the property of
the people of the State . . . .”); see Sandra B. Zellmer & Jessica Harder, Unbundling Property 
in Water, 59 ALA. L. REV. 679, 684 (2008) (“Instead of perpetuating the commonly employed 
‘bundle of rights’ metaphor to describe property, we seek an organic, two-dimensional symbol 
that better reflects property-based relationships with things.”).
220. Water Rights Process, supra note 22 (“A water right is a legal entitlement authorizing 
water to be diverted from a specific source and put to beneficial, nonwasteful use.”); see
Shelley Ross Saxer, The Fluid Nature of Property Rights in Water, 21 DUKE ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y 49, 53 (2010) (“While the majority of state legislatures and state and federal courts 
continue to talk about water rights in property terms, water rights are generally viewed not 
as actual property rights subject to a taking under the Fifth Amendment, but as usufructuary
1104
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California, it is unclear whether a water rights holder would have a valid
claim when the government interferes with a vested right that does not 
equate to ownership.221 
Prescriptive water rights especially can and should be eliminated under 
the regulatory use doctrine.  Prescription is a specific method of obtaining 
water rights that also does not result in the ownership of water; it only results 
in the right to use the water.222  Prescriptive rights may be acquired by an
appropriative taking of water if the use is “actual, open and notorious, hostile 
and adverse to the original owner, continuous and uninterrupted for the statutory
period of five years, and under a claim of right.”223  Prescriptive rights are
difficult to obtain, can only be approved by a court, and are rarely approved 
rights, or a license from the state or federal government that can be revoked and is governed by
contract rights.”). 
221. BILL HIGGINS, INST. FOR LOCAL GOV’T , REGULATORY TAKINGS AND LAND USE
REGULATION: A PRIMER FOR PUBLIC AGENCY STAFF 1, 16 (July 2006), http://www.ca-
ilg.org/sites/main/files/file-attachments/resources__Takings_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/ECY2-
82LE] (“Can a property owner claim a compensable taking when a public agency interferes
with a vested right? The answer is not entirely clear. California courts have not addressed 
this issue directly.”).
222. 	  Prescription is addressed in the California Civil Code: 
Occupancy for the period prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure as sufficient
to bar any action for the recovery of the property confers a title thereto, denominated
a title by prescription, which is sufficient against all, but no possession by any
person, firm or corporation no matter how long continued of any land, water,
water right, easement, or other property whatsoever dedicated to a public use by
a public utility, or dedicated to or owned by the state or any public entity, shall 
ever ripen into any title, interest or right against the owner thereof. 
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1007 (West 2007) (emphasis added); see About California Water Rights, 
E. MUN. WATER DIST., http://www.emwd.org/services/drinking-water-service/water-supply/ 
about-california-water-rights [https://perma.cc/X6WD-53S9] (last visited Nov. 11, 2016)
(“Claim of a prescriptive water right to non-surplus water by an appropriator must be
supported by many specific conditions which include a showing that the pumping was
actual, open, notorious, hostile, adverse to the overlying user, continuous and uninterrupted for
five years, and under a claim of right.”); see also Ella Foley-Gannon, Institutional Arrangements
for Conjunctive Water Management in California and Analysis of Legal Reform Alternatives, 14
HASTINGS W.-N.W. J. ENV. L. & POL’Y 1105, 1125 (2008) (“Such prescriptive rights [established
by public agencies against private groundwater users] may become superior to the overlying
landowners’ rights.”). 
223. City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 207 P.2d 17, 29 (Cal. 1949) (“Prescriptive
rights are not acquired by the taking of surplus or excess water, since no injunction may be
issued against the taking and the appropriator may take the surplus without giving compensation; 
however, both overlying owners and appropriators are entitled to the protection of the courts
against any substantial infringement of their rights in water which they reasonably and
beneficially need.” (citing Peabody v. City of Vallejo, 40 P.2d 486, 491–92 (1935)))). 
1105
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in California.224  This category can and should be eliminated under the
regulatory use doctrine, because these rights are usufructuary and can be 
limited by state use regulations on public property.225 
2. Lucas, Penn Central, and Reasonable Beneficial Use 
The federal government has determined whether state action constitutes 
a use regulation, or has gone too far and is considered a regulatory taking. 
For example, in the quintessential takings case Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, petitioner landowner bought two lots of property on which
he planned on building homes.226  After the South Carolina Legislature enacted 
the Beachfront Management Act, petitioner could not build homes on his 
two lots, and the trial court rendered his property valueless.227  The United 
States Supreme Court held that a state regulation that “deprives land of all 
economically beneficial use” is considered a taking, and the state must pay
the owner compensation.228  The Court noted that South Carolina could not
simply argue that the petitioner’s desired uses for the land were inconsistent
 224. Frequently Asked Questions, CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.waterboards. 
ca.gov/waterrights/board_info/faqs.shtml [https://perma.cc/92F4-XDC2] (last visited Nov. 
11, 2016) (“Prescriptive rights are difficult to obtain and can only be granted by a court. 
Most people in California do not have and cannot acquire a prescriptive right.”). 
225. City of Santa Maria v. Adam, 149 Cal. Rptr. 3d 491, 516 (Ct. App. 2012) (“That 
is, the usufructuary right ‘is a right to use a watercourse, to avail oneself of its fruits by
diversion, which therefore provides (1) an opportunity (2) to use beneficially (3) the diverted
water.’” (citation omitted)).
226. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1006–07 (1992); see Hope
M. Babcock, Should Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council Protect Where the Wild Things 
Are? Of Beavers, Bob-o-Links, and Other Things That Go Bump in the Night, 85 IOWA L.
REV. 849, 853 (2000) (“This Article suggests that Lucas was primarily an attempt by the 
Court to simplify the judicial task of resolving what Robert Gordon refers to as the ‘hard
cases’ involving land disputes, and that, with respect to laws protecting wildlife, the Court 
did not succeed in its quest.” (citing Robert Gordon, Paradoxical Property, in  EARLY 
MODERN CONCEPTIONS OF PROPERTY 95, 101 (John Brewer & Susan Staves eds., 1995))). 
227. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1007; see Benjamin Allee, Drawing the Line in Regulatory
Takings Law: How a Benefits Fraction Supports the Fee Simple Approach to the Denominator 
Problem, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1957, 1959 (2002) (explaining that the denominator problem
occurs when a regulation causes an economic impact to a person’s land, and the court can 
represent the takings analysis with a fraction); id. (“[T]he numerator is the economic harm 
to a particular parcel caused by a government regulation.”); id. (“[T]he denominator is the 
total unregulated economic value of the relevant parcel against which the economic harm 
is compared.”).
228. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027; see Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S.
104 (1978); see also Eminent Domain/Regulatory Takings, PROP. RIGHTS ALLIANCE, http://
www.propertyrightsalliance.org/eminent-domain-regulatory-takings-a2909 [https://perma.cc/
8Y5S-AX6N] (last visited Nov. 11, 2016) (“Regulatory takings occur when the government
literally regulates a piece of property out of the hands of its private owner without actually
changing the titled ownership.”). 
1106
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with the public interest, because a state may not “transform private property 
into public property without compensation.”229 
Similarly, in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City (Penn 
Central), the Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs did not establish a 
taking when they were barred from building above Penn Central Station,
because the restrictions: 1) promoted the general welfare, 2) permitted reasonable 
beneficial use of the landmark site, and 3) allowed plaintiffs the chance to 
enhance the terminal and other properties.230  Here, the Court again stated 
that a takings claim was satisfied “only by proof that the regulation deprived
them of all reasonable beneficial use of the property.”231 
3. Use Regulations of Public Water Would Promote the General 
Welfare and Put Public Water to Reasonable Beneficial Use 
If the state can justify to courts that it is regulating the use of water and
not taking private property, it could succeed in regulating water use under
a regulatory use argument.  Taking prior appropriation water rights equates to
a regulation of water use.232  It is not seizing private property through the
 229. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031 (quoting Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 
449 U.S. 155, 164 (1980)); see also John E. Fee, The Takings Clause as a Comparative
Right, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1003, 1041 (2003) (explaining that if we reconceive the regulatory
takings doctrine as a comparative right, “the antidiscrimination interpretation of the Takings
Clause suggests that we recognize regulatory takings in relation to how the government 
regulates other owners”). 
230. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 138 (1978); see David L. Callies, Regulatory 
Takings and The Supreme Court: How Perspectives on Property Rights Have Changed from Penn
Central to Dolan, and What State and Federal Courts Are Doing About it, 28 STETSON L.
REV. 523, 534 (1999) (explaining that the Court in Penn Central held that “‘taking’
jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to determine
whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated,” and rather the Court
focuses on the “character of the action” and the “nature and extent of the interference
with rights in the parcel as a whole”).
231. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 119; see Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S.
374, 386 (1994) (holding that in order to determine an unconstitutional taking where 
conditions required the dedication of land to a city in order to grant a building permit, the
court must determine whether a nexus exists between a legitimate state interest and the 
permit conditions, and if so, whether the city has shown a proportionality between the 
exactions and the projected impact of the proposed development). 
232. Higgins, supra note 221, at 15 (“Not all interests in property rise to the level of
a recognized property right.”); id. (“The status of contract deliveries of water to farmers
and irrigation districts through state and federal water projects is an example.”); see Allegretti
& Co. v. County of Imperial, 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d 122, 130–31 (Ct. App. 2006) (holding that 
the county’s imposition of a permit limiting the total quantity of groundwater available for 
1107









     
 
 
    
 
  














     
    
  
    






eminent domain doctrine.233  Under Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 
the state could argue that it is not depriving private individuals or entities 
of their property, or senior water rights and appropriated rights, because
they only acquired the right to use the state’s property in the first place.234 
Penn Central is distinguishable because it dealt with regulating the air space
above the train station, protected by New York City’s Landmarks Preservation
Law.235  However, under Penn Central, the state would still likely have a
good case, because: 1) the restriction would benefit the general welfare by 
allowing the state to manage water supplies more efficiently throughout
the state; and 2) the owner of the right would still obtain water, it would just 
come from the state’s control, and the water would be put to reasonable
beneficial use.236  The third Penn Central factor does not directly apply 
because water is not a landmark.237 
his use is not a physical taking, because the county did not encroach on his property, nor did it
appropriate, impound, or divert any of his water). 
233. Higgins, supra note 221, at 16 (noting that it is unclear if a property owner can
claim a taking if a public agency “interferes with a vested right”). But see Washoe County
v. United States, 319 F.3d 1320, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (finding a physical taking where 
the government physically diverted water for its own consumptive use, or decreased the 
amount of water accessible by the owner of the water rights). 
234. Lucas discusses how the government must compensate the owner of property
when he sacrifices all economically beneficial uses of his property to the government, where 
here, water is not “owned” property. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019; see also Water Rights Process, 
supra note 22 (“Water rights are property rights, but their holders do not own the water 
itself.”).
235. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 109–10 (“[New York City] acted from the 
conviction that ‘the standing of [New York City] as a world-wide tourist center and world 
capital of business, culture and government’ would be threatened if legislation were not 
enacted to protect historic landmarks and neighborhoods from precipitate decisions to
destroy or fundamentally alter their character.” (citation omitted)).  New York City’s Landmark
Preservation Law has been updated since Penn Cent. Trans. Co. For information on New 
York City’s Landmarks Preservation Law in its current form, see Landmarks Preservation 
and Historic Districts, N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 25-301 et seq. (West 2015). See also History of
The LPC & The Landmarks Law, NYC LANDMARKS PRESERV. COMM’N, http://www1.
nyc.gov/site/lpc/about/about-lpc.page [https://perma.cc/EHX9-F6ZW] (last visited Nov. 11,
2016).
236. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 138; see Steven J. Eagle, The Four-Factor
Penn Central Regulatory Takings Test, 118 PENN. ST. L. REV. 601, 612 (2014) (discussing
how a fourth factor taking into account the “parcel as a whole” rule would be beneficial in
specifying the physical boundaries of a parcel of land in which the three factors play out, 
and that would help shape the meaning of the existing three factors). 
237. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 138 (“[The restrictions] also afford
appellants opportunities further to enhance not only the Terminal site proper but also other 
properties.”); see History of The LPC & The Landmarks Law, supra note 235 (“The 
Commission was created in 1965 through groundbreaking legislation signed by the late 
Mayor Robert F. Wagner in response to the mounting losses of historically significant 
buildings in New York City, most notably Pennsylvania Station.”). 
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Furthermore, under this doctrine it can be reasonably inferred that the 
state’s power can also end the practice of prescription of water rights, and take
water back as its own property.238  Because prescription is based on the right to 
use water, the state can take back the right to use through use restrictions.239 
Eliminating this category would support efficiency between water use and 
land development, because the state would add to its control over the water 
source in California and be in a better position to manage the amount of
water each area should receive. 
IV. PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE AND POLICY CHANGES TO CONFORM
 




To encourage efficiency in both water distribution and land development
in California, the legislature should amend the California Constitution to
explicitly enable the state to take control over water rights from senior water 
rights holders and appropriators, as well as control and redefine the
requirements in general plans.240 
A. Amending California’s Constitution 
California currently employs bureaucratic regulation to manage its water
supply.241  The State Water Board is the only agency with authority to 
238. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2; see O’Dea, supra note 126, at 439 (noting that the state 
can assert that public trust resources, including navigable waters, are public property
within the state’s public trust jurisdiction).
239. CAL CONST. art. X, § 2; Jennifer N. Horchem, Comment, Water Scarcity: The
Need to Apply a Regulatory Takings Analysis to Partial Restrictions On Water Use, 48
WASHBURN L.J. 729, 748 (2009) (“Here, the water district only had a right to use water–a 
non-possessory property interest–which cannot be physically occupied by a mere restriction on
use.”).
240. Bettina Boxall, California Moves to Restrict Water Pumping by Pre-1914 Rights 
Holders, L.A. TIMES (June 12, 2015, 5:01 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-
ln-drought-water-rights-20150612-story.html [https://perma.cc/X9KT-LTNF] (“For the first 
time in nearly 40 years, state regulators are telling more than 100 growers and irrigation
districts with some of the oldest water rights in California that they have to stop drawing 
supplies from drought-starved rivers and streams in Central Valley.”). 
241. Sue McClurg, Water Management in California, WATER ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://
www.waterencyclopedia.com/Bi-Ca/California-Water-Management-in.html [https://perma.cc/ 
HZB2-LSTE] (last visited Nov. 11, 2016) (noting that key agencies involved in water issues
include the California Department of Water Resources, the California State Water Resources 
Control Board, the California Department of Health Services, the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation,
1109
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administer water rights in California; however, local governments, water 
districts, and the California Regional Water Quality Control Boards have 
authority over other water-related matters such as maintaining adequate 
water supplies and water quality, as well as making responsible land use
decisions.242  This proposal recommends that the state legislature should
first amend California Constitution Article X, Section 2 to expand the State
Water Board’s authority and enable it to revoke private water rights.243  The 
new added language would provide:
The State has the legal police power to take back all types of private water use 
rights, including but not limited to riparian rights, senior rights, and appropriated
rights, in times of water shortage or at any time the State determines that water in
the State is not being put to beneficial and reasonable use. The State must then 
centralize control over the water rights, and redistribute the water in the most
beneficial and reasonable way to the local water managers of the State.
With this explicit language in place, the State Water Board would be immune
from claims by private water rights holders that the state illegally took their
private rights.  The state also could justify the legality of this new language
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and the 
U.S. Geological Survey); see CAL. DEP’T OF WATER RES., http://www.water.ca.gov/ [https://
perma.cc/5V9U-J9Q6] (last updated Oct. 7, 2016) (“The Department of Water Resources 
(DWR) is responsible for managing and protecting California’s water.”); id. (“DWR works
with other agencies to benefit the state’s people . . . .”); see Water Rights Process, supra
note 22 (discussing how California blends two kinds of water rights: riparian rights and
appropriative rights).
242. About Us, CAL. DEP’T OF WATER RES., http://www.water.ca.gov/aboutus.cfm 
[https://perma.cc/C4UE-VYFG] (last updated July 19, 2016) (“Working with other agencies 
and the public, DWR develops strategic goals, and near-term and long-term actions to conserve,
manage, develop, and sustain California’s watersheds, water resources, and management
systems.”); Water, LOCAL GOV’T COMM’N, http://www.lgc.org/the-issues/water/ [https://perma.
cc/E5AD-695H] (last visited Nov. 11, 2016) (“Maintaining adequate water supplies and 
water quality, and protecting the beneficial uses of water depends largely on land use
decisions made by local government.”); Water Board’s Structure, supra note 61 (“The 
mission of the Water Board is to ensure the highest reasonable quality for waters of the 
State, while allocating those waters to achieve the optimum balance of beneficial uses.”);
see Tim Reid, In California Drought, Big Money, Many Actors, Little Oversight, REUTERS
(Apr. 25, 2014, 7:19 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-california-water-insight-
idUSBREA3O0YF20140425 [https://perma.cc/E4U4-G3CK] (“There are so many [local 
water] agencies [providing the state with water], in fact, that the California Department of 
Water Resource, which is responsible for managing and protecting the state’s water, concedes
that it does not even know the exact number.”). 
243. Tim Hearden, Calif. Issues Shutoff Orders to 114 Senior Water Right Holders, 
CAP. PRESS (June 12, 2015, 2:32 PM), http://www.capitalpress.com/California/20150612/ 
calif-issues-shutoff-orders-to-114-senior-water-right-holders [https://perma.cc/EUN9-C8UF]
(“Still, the latest shutoffs . . . were the state’s first widespread curtailments of senior water
right holders since 1977.”); id. (“[The shutoffs] prompted an immediate response from the 
California Farm Bureau Federation, which again blamed a lack of water storage for the 
shortage.”). 
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through the public trust doctrine, eminent domain doctrine, or regulatory 
use doctrines discussed above.244 
The state will have to revoke existing permits from appropriators, and 
inform senior water rights holders that they cannot continue using water 
without prior state approval.245  California would likely not be successful 
in using the “share and share alike” principle that governs in most eastern
states’ water law, because eastern states have different rainfall patterns and 
are not faced with water shortages like California.246  Therefore, continuing 
with the bureaucratic process in place is California’s best option, although
authority must be centralized more in the State Water Board through this 
new ability to revoke private water rights. 
The state can attempt to validate its actions against any takings claims
through the public trust doctrine, the concept of eminent domain, or a
regulatory use claim discussed above, because the state’s goal is to improve 
California’s welfare.247  One alternative to amending the constitution would 
be to allow state courts to redefine water rights in California as purely public 
rights, or alternatively, not enforce private water use rights when the state
takes the rights back, because state courts traditionally have the authority 
to enforce water rights.248  However, this process of creating a solution through 
common law reform would take too long.  By eliminating private water use 
rights and giving the state legislature more direct control through the immediate 
effect of a constitutional amendment, the state will be also better equipped 
to coordinate water and land development.  Besides a constitutional amendment,
 244. See supra Part III. 
245. Water Rights, supra note 27 (explaining that the State Water Board can modify
permits and licenses it issued to require more protection of water resources, but it must provide
the permit or license holder with notice and opportunity for a hearing before it makes 
changes).
246. Water Rights, supra note 27; see Arnold, supra note 154 (“In contrast [to the western 
states’ prior appropriation doctrine], the riparian doctrine that pertains where water is more
plentiful [such as in eastern states] follows a share-and-share-alike principle where everyone
(or at least each riparian) is entitled to a reasonable share of the water resource . . . .”).
247. See supra Part III; O’Dea, supra note 126, at 440 (explaining the history and
definition of the public trust, notably that “[California’s] public trust doctrine is the legal
principle that the state is trustee of certain natural resources held ‘in trust’ for the people”). 
248. Water Rights Process, supra note 22 (explaining that beyond administering
permits and licenses to water use rights, the State Water Board has other responsibilities, 
including statutory adjudication in determining all water rights in a stream system, and court
reference); id. (noting that a court decree ultimately determines the water rights in the steam
system at issue, and the State Water Board can act as a “referee in water right lawsuits” in
recommending a decision or answering questions of fact).
1111
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the state can implement a separate law mandating a statewide standard form
general plan, discussed below, with stricter requirements for ascertaining 
an available water supply and creating sustainable development plans prior 
to building or developing land.249 
B. Reforming General Plans 
Cities and counties must have general plans when they want to develop 
land in accordance with available water sources, and these plans should 
have more stringent conservation requirements to actually manage water 
resources more efficiently.250 Several options to coordinate land use planners
and water agencies include redefining the coordination requirement of the 
conservation element in general plans to facilitate cooperation between land 
developers and water agencies.251  For example, Sonoma County passed 
the 2020 Sonoma County General Plan in 2008.252  The plan requires the 
249. See infra Part IV (b); see SAN DIEGO INTEGRATED REG’L WATER MGMT., LAND USE
AND WATER MANAGEMENT STUDY 1, 14 (2013), http://www.sandiego.gov/citycouncil/ 
committees/wpitf/pdf/rwmlandusestudycombined.pdf [https://perma.cc/FVF2-686J] 
(explaining that San Diego’s 2013 Integrated Regional Water Management Plan Update 
aims to improve communication between water resources and land use planners through
“grants, new or existing working groups and collaborations, preparation of work products, . . .
and dissemination of information.”); see also Jeremy Madsen, What is Smart Growth? A
Water-Conservation Tool, WATER DEEPLY (Dec. 17, 2015), http://www.waterdeeply.org/op-eds/ 
2015/12/9179/smart-growth-water-conservation-tool/ [https://perma.cc/4GUL-CE3X]
(explaining that smart growth development, a pattern that mixes housing types and different 
kinds of businesses in a water-conscious manner, is an effective way to use less water in 
new land developments). 
250. CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 65302–65303.4 (West 2010).  For an example of Arizona’s
general plan system that enables more state control of land development with available water 
supplies, see Ed Bolen et al., Smart Growth: A Review of Programs State by State, 8 HASTINGS
W.-N.W. J. ENV. L. & POL’Y 145, 151 (2002) (“[The Growing Smarter Plus package] increases 
citizen involvement in community planning by [giving municipalities stronger tools to control 
urban sprawl and] requiring votes on general plans of large and growing communities at
least once every ten years.”).
251. FIRMACION & RASKIN, supra note 6, at 4 (providing recommendations to facilitate 
coordination between land planners and water managers, including “redefining the ‘coordination’
requirement of the conservation element in general plans to facilitate coordination . . . .”).
For an example of efforts to facilitate water agency and land development coordination, see
THAD BETTNER ET AL., CAL. ROUNDTABLE ON WATER & FOOD SUPPLY, APPLYING THE
CONNECTIVITY APPROACH: GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENT IN CALIFORNIA’S KINGS BASIN
1, 8 (2015), http://www.aginnovations.org/uploads/result/1431289041-3c5f8f9ff686f5e5c/ 
Kings_Basin_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/T579-32DA] (“Cooperation between land use 
planning authorities and water agencies is critical to the realization of a sustainable water 
budget, and the [Kings Basin Water Authority] has become a forum where the two sectors 
interact.”).
252. Sonoma County General Plan 2020, PERMIT & RES. MGMT. DEP’T, http://www.
sonoma-county.org/PRMD/gp2020/index.htm [https://perma.cc/E4RM-4TBV] (last updated
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county to “work with” and “cooperate” with public water agencies to
accomplish the goals in the plan.253  This is a more stringent requirement
than the coordination requirement in California law, because it requires a
measure of cooperation between the county and water agencies rather than
simple coordination.254  The cooperation requirement exemplifies that there
should be a statewide requirement that public water agencies can oppose
land development if it will use water irresponsibly, and public water agencies
must work with and cooperate with land developers.255 Waiting for Sonoma
County’s example to occur in every county across the state would be
to condemn the California water supply; this would simply take too long.
Nov. 11, 2016) (describing the Sonoma County General Plan 2020); see FIRMACION & RASKIN, 
supra note 6, at 25–27. 
253. Sonoma County General Plan 2020, supra note 252; SONOMA COUNTY PERMIT 
& RES. MGMT. DEP’T, SONOMA COUNTY GENERAL PLAN 2020: LAND USE ELEMENT, at LU-
44 (2008), http://www.sonoma-county.org/prmd/gp2020/lue.pdf [https://perma.cc/694S-
E9B5] (“Coordinate with operators of public water systems to provide an adequate supply
to meet long term needs consistent with general plans and urban water management plans.”).
254. GOV’T § 65302(d)(1) (“That portion of the conservation element including 
waters shall be developed in coordination with any countywide water agency and with all 
district and city agencies . . . .”); see, e.g., SONOMA COUNTY PERMIT & RES. MGMT. DEP’T,
SONOMA COUNTY GENERAL PLAN 2020: WATER RES. ELEMENT, at WR-17, WR-21-23, WR-28
(2008), http://www.sonoma-county.org/prmd/gp2020/wre.pdf [https://perma.cc/E5GD-V98D].
For an example of a General Plan that does not include a specific “cooperation” element, 
see SAN DIEGO COUNTY GENERAL PLAN: A PLAN FOR GROWTH, CONSERVATION, AND
SUSTAINABILITY 1–19 (Aug. 2011), http://www.sandiegocounty.gov/pds/gpupdate/docs/GP/
Cover_Intro_Vision.pdf [https://perma.cc/GQ2N-4SKF] (noting that water conservation,
sustainable development, and drought-efficient landscaping are a few of the city’s strategies to
conserve and reduce water consumption). 
255. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 66473.7 (West 2009) (explaining that a “sufficient water 
supply” is a condition for a tentative map for new land development and planning, which
requires considering many factors including, but not limited to, the availability of water
supplies over twenty years, the amount of water that the water supplier can reasonably rely
on receiving from other water supply projects, and other factors); see CAL. WATER CODE
§ 10910(b) (West Supp. 2016) (“The city or county, at the time that it determines whether 
an environmental impact report, a negative declaration, or a mitigated negative declaration
is required for any project subject to the California Environmental Quality Act pursuant to
Section 21080.1 of the Public Resources Code, shall identify any water system that is, or
may become as a result of supplying water to the project identified pursuant to this subdivision,
a public water system, as defined in Section 10912, that may supply water for the project . . . .”); 
see also Ry Rivard, New Houses Won’t Drain Our Water Supply, VOICE OF SAN DIEGO
(May 4, 2015), http://www.voiceofsandiego.org/topics/land-use/new-houses-wont-drain-
our-water-supply/ [https://perma.cc/U8DS-HP5R] (“The San Diego County Water Authority
expects the county will have enough water to accommodate a growing population and new 
development for the foreseeable future, including major projects like the controversial One 
Paseo in Carmel Valley.”).
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The state can take this as an example of a broader government authority
to create a standard form general plan, including general requirements for 
cooperation between land developers and water agencies, as well as a 
requirement for a certain amount of water available to build new developments. 
Several counties and cities have taken similar approaches to Sonoma 
County and have attempted to harmonize land development with scarce water
resources in California.256  These are microcosms of what the state legislature
can do; if the state were to take similar measures in a large scale, perhaps
much more change could eventually occur.257  First, in the City and County
of San Francisco, the Residential Water Conservation Ordinance of 1992—
amended in 2009—requires owners of most residential buildings to “obtain a
certificate of compliance before they transfer title after a sale.”258  The 
certification requires, for example, low-flow showerheads, efficient toilets,
and leak detection and repair.259  Second, Sacramento’s Water Conservation 
Plan, implemented on October 29, 2013, includes in part a discussion of 
how water conservation instead of adding infrastructure can meet most of 
256. Henderson, supra note 114, at 11 (“Civil Code Section 1101.8 permits local
governments and retail water suppliers to enact ordinances or adopt regulations that
promote compliance with or exceed water savings targets . . . many cities and counties 
have enacted ordinances regarding water conservation and efficiency.”); see also TULLY
& YOUNG, N. CAL. WATER ASS’N, SACRAMENTO VALLEY: LAND USE/WATER SUPPLY ANALYSIS
GUIDEBOOK 1, 21–30 (Nov. 2007), http://www.norcalwater.org/res/docs/NCWA-guidebook-
final.pdf [https://perma.cc/9EVW-BUPU] (“Commonly referred to as ‘SB 610 Water Supply
Assessment,’ Water Code section 10910 et seq. outlines the necessary information and analysis
that must be included in an environmental impact report (EIR) to ensure that a proposed land
development has a sufficient water supply to meet existing and planned water demands 
over a 20 year projection.”). 
257. Henderson, supra note 38, at 11 (“The bulk of water conservation work is done 
at the local level with many local governments adopting regulations or ordinances mandating 
water conservation and efficiency.”); see Melanie Curry, For First Time in Over a Decade, 
State to Update Local Planning Guidelines, STREETS BLOG (Nov. 4, 2015), http://cal.streetsblog. 
org/2015/11/04/for-first-time-in-over-a-decade-state-to-update-local-planning-guidelines/
[https://perma.cc/4MLZ-J6WU] (explaining that California’s Office of Planning and Research 
is updating its General Plan Guidelines, which occurs every ten to fifteen years, and helps 
cities and counties promote future growth that must be consistent with the general plan).
258. Henderson, supra note 38, at 11; see What You Should Know About the Residential
Energy Conservation Ordinance (RECO), S.F. DEP’T OF BUILDING INSPECTION 1, 2–3 (2007),
http://www.sfdbi.org/ftp/uploadedfiles/dbi/Key_Information/ResidentialEnergyConserva
tionOrdinance.pdf (https://perma.cc/N2VN-9QUM] (“Owners of residential property who 
wish to sell their property, must obtain a valid inspection, install certain energy and water 
conservation devices or materials and then obtain a certificate of compliance.”).
259. Henderson, supra note 38, at 12 (“Certification requires low-flow showerheads, 
faucets and faucet aerators, efficient toilets, and leak detection and repair, among other criteria
[that mirror Civil Code Section 1101.3(c)’s standards].”); see Residential Water Conservation, 
S.F. WATER POWER SEWER, http://www.sfwater.org/index.aspx?page=688 [https://perma.cc/ 
48JQ-KRRB] (last visited Nov. 11, 2016) (“Inefficient plumbing fixtures manufactured and
installed prior to 1994 must be replaced with efficient fixtures [in compliance with the 2009
ordinances].”). 
1114
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the city’s future water demand.260  Third, the City of Petaluma’s Water 
Conservation Regulations Ordinance requires efficient water use for new 
construction and existing customers, as well as lays out new development 
standards and regulations prohibiting water waste.261 
While all of these cities are taking steps in the right direction in attempting 
to curb water waste and promote efficiency, these minor changes are valiant 
efforts but are simply not enough to solve an entire state’s problem.262 
The state should impose one standard form general plan with requirements
 260. Henderson, supra note 38, at 12; Water Conservation and Drought in Sacramento
County, SACRAMENTO COUNTY, http://www.saccounty.net/waterconservation/Pages/Water
Conservation.aspx [https://perma.cc/NWR5-M4QC] (last visited Nov. 11, 2016) (“Sacramento
County has been working steadily to reduce the amount of water used in our operations, from 
reducing landscape irrigation, to installing low-use plumbing fixtures, and to reducing watering
of our parks.”); see also Debbie Arrington, Hoping Drought Lessons Stick for Sacramento 
Water Users Despite Rain, SACRAMENTO BEE (Feb. 23, 2016, 4:01 PM), www.sacbee.com/news/
state/california/water-and-drought/article62119742.html [https://perma.cc/GZS2-R53L] (“After
months of conserving 25 percent or more on water use, Sacramento-area consumers pulled 
back by only 11 percent—less than half the target savings—in January compared with that 
same month in 2013, the baseline year used for state conservation comparisons.”). 
261. PETALUMA, CAL., ORDINANCE NO. 2316, ch. 15.17, § 3 (2009), http://www.cityof 
petaluma.net/wrcd/pdf/2316-ncs-water-conservation.pdf [https://perma.cc/HF5Z-SPUH]
(“WHEREAS, adoption of a mandatory Water Conservation Ordinance with development 
standards, landscape water efficiency standards and water waste prohibitions will carry
out General Plan policy, provide careful stewardship of water resources available to the 
City to provide for orderly application of water conservation measures, and will have the 
positive impact of creating substantial water savings.”); Water Resources and Conservation, 
CITY OF PETALUMA, http://cityofpetaluma.net/wrcd/waterconservation.html [https://perma.cc/
J4FQ-KFE7] (last visited Nov. 11, 2016) (“The City of Petaluma has several progressive 
water-saving programs and resources available to you to help you do your part to conserve
water.”); see Henderson, supra note 38, at 12. 
262. Currently, California law requires that land use be coordinated with water resource
management.  CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65302(d)(1) (West 2010) (“That portion of the conservation 
element including waters shall be developed in coordination with any countywide water
agency and with all district and city agencies . . . coordination shall include the discussion 
and evaluation of any water supply and demand information described in Section 65352.5, 
if that information has been submitted by the water agency to the city or county.”).  Rewording 
this provision to instead state the following, for example, could be beneficial in enforcing
mandatory statewide cooperation of land development and water management: “That portion
of the conservation element including waters shall be developed with full cooperation with 
any countrywide water agency and with all district and city agencies . . . where cooperation is
mandatory and shall include working together, sharing information, and establishing an
available water supply that will sustain a new land development for at least 20 years into the 
future . . . .” See Henderson, supra note 38, at 14 (noting that during the State Water Resources 
Control Board meeting on June 17, 2014, “the need for more statewide conservation measures
was confirmed,” and further measures beyond Governor Brown’s mandatory 20% reduction in
water use are necessary).
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that must be met before development can commence, with secure water sources 
in place and sufficient water sources to sustain the number of people and 
businesses that will require the water.  Land developers and water agencies
must cooperate and understand each other in order to maintain efficient
water management, but the state must take direct control over how land 
development is managed in the future.
The Local Government Commission provides suggestions for sustainable
and environmentally friendly local growth plans, including avoiding auto-
oriented land-use patterns, which cause water pollution and flooding.263 
The Commission also suggests land development in already developed areas, 
creating “walkable,” mixed-transit developments, creating a funding source
for purchasing and protecting valuable open space areas, and following the
Ahwahnee principles for resource-efficient communities in the land use element
of the general plan.264  The Ahwahnee principles call for “compact, walkable
development,” and “hundreds of local jurisdictions have already adopted 
these principles, in whole or in part.”265 The state could use these suggestions
as a framework for a state-mandated general form with a focus on 
sustainability. 
263. LOCAL GOV’T COMM’N, LIVABLE COMMUNITIES AND WATER 1, 2 (2014), http:// 
www.lgc.org/wordpress/docs/resources/water/water_livable_communities.pdf  [https://perma.cc/
95Q6-P5UU]  (“One study demonstrated that compact, walkable development can reduce 
runoff caused by impervious surfaces like roads and parking lots] by two-thirds compared 
to sprawl development.”); see James A. Kushner, Smart Growth, New Urbanism and Diversity: 
Progressive Planning Movements in America and Their Impact on Poor and Minority Ethnic 
Populations, 21 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 45, 48 (2002–03) (“Smart Growth calls for
public subsidies for growth, such as facilities and infrastructure subsidies, being targeted
at areas deemed appropriate for urbanization.”). 
264. Patrick Stoner, Sustainable Cities as Communities and Villages, in SUSTAINABLE 
COMMUNITIES 45, 46–47 (Woodrow W. Clark II ed., 2010); LIVABLE COMMUNITIES AND
WATER, supra note 263, at 3, 6 (“For the sake of preserving our water supplies, we need
to grow in the form of compact, mixed-use, transit-oriented development.”); see F. Kaid 
Benfield, The Environmental Impacts of Land Development Depend Largely on Where We 
Put It, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 11, 2015, 8:53 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/f-kaid-
benfield/the-environmental-impacts_b_7967302.html [https://perma.cc/4HV8-ZQ7H]
(“Whether a development has a good street pattern, is walkable, uses land efficiently, provides
shops and other lifestyle conveniences and amenities conveniently accessible to homes,
has green buildings and infrastructure, and so forth will have an effect on how it performs
with respect to carbon emissions, air and water pollution, ecosystem conservation, and other
environmental indicia.”).
265. LIVABLE COMMUNITIES AND WATER, supra note 263, at 3, 6; see also Make 
Development Decisions Predictable and Fair: Compact Development Endorsement Program, 
San Francisco Bay Area Communities, California, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.
epa.gov/smartgrowth/make-development-decisions-predictable-and-fair-compact-
development-endorsement-program [https://perma.cc/CK4Q-6CCC] (last updated Mar. 29,
2016) (“The [Greenbelt Alliance] has long realized that building more compactly allows
communities to accommodate new growth, creates more housing and transportation options,
and protect[s] open space.”). 
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Municipal water agencies and local governments will not become defunct 
or useless under this proposal.  As noted above, local control is preferred to
overarching state control for many reasons.266  Today, more state control is
necessary in enforcing efficient land development with the current water
supply.  The state should be the initial distributer of the water to regions and
counties and cities, and it should give the stamp of approval when
municipalities want to expand or land developers want to create new 
communities.  However, local agencies will be necessary to carry out the 
will of the state and enforce order within the region or locality.  These local 
entities will also have to collaborate more with the state government to maintain 
efficiency and progress in both the water management and land development
realms. 
C. Funding
For this proposal to be successful, the State Water Board needs more
funding if it can be expected to obtain more information about water use 
and plan effective strategies.  For example, when the Board investigates a 
water right for public trust purposes, the burden of gathering information rests 
on the Board and it thus needs resources to be able to gather information.267 
The Board is “chronically underfunded,” has a small staff, and thus has a 
very difficult time gathering the information necessary for the public trust 
adjudications.268  The state legislature can and should attempt to divert more
of the budget to the State Water Resources Control Board.269  The federal 
266. ASSEM. INTERIM COMM. ON WATER TO THE CAL. LEGISLATURE, GROUND WATER
PROBLEMS IN CALIFORNIA, 26 ASSEM. INTERIM COMM. REP. 46 (1962); see supra Part II (a); see
also Water Management, WASH. LOCAL GOV’T ASS’N, http://walga.asn.au/Policy-Advice-
and-Advocacy/Environment/Water-Management.aspx [https://perma.cc/8N4H-K656] 
(last visited Nov. 11, 2016) (“Water Management is critically important for Local
Governments . . . .”).
267. O’Dea, supra note 126, at 450 (“Yet, perhaps the most significant obstacle to the
Board’s ability to proactively manage California’s water systems is its lack of resources 
to conduct its own independent analyses of water rights.”); see id. at n.131. 
268. Chris Megerian, State Water Regulator Flexes New Muscle in Response to Drought, 
L.A. TIMES (Apr. 14, 2015, 9:41 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/politics/la-me-pol-
water-board-20150415-story.html [ (“How well it is able to enforce the governor’s orders 
will be a major test for the [State Water Resources Control Board], which Marcus [State Water 
Resources Control Board Chair] says remains underfunded.”); O’Dea, supra note 126, at 
450. 
269. Environmental Protection, GOVERNOR’S BUDGET 2015–16 (June 24, 2015), http://
www.ebudget.ca.gov/2015-16/Enacted/StateAgencyBudgets/3890/3940/department.html
[https://perma.cc/S9GD-Y2JS] (explaining that currently, California’s Governor’s Budget
1117
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government can also contribute an increased budget to California to help 
with the Board’s ability to gather information and implement new responsible 
water policy.  This likely would not face much protest, given the importance 
of conserving and managing water, the impact of the current drought, and
the need for increased governmental oversight over water distribution.270 
This is an important cause for the entire United States to support, however,
because California’s water crisis will soon become the entire country’s crisis, 
as the drought has and will continue to affect crop production and thus food
production.271  There are also dire effects on the environment, wildlife, and 
habitats that accompany California’s water problems.272 
for 2015-2016 allocates funding under the Environmental Protection portion of the budget, 
section 3940 to the State Water Resources Control Board); MAC TAYLOR, LEGIS. ANALYST’S 
OFF., THE 2015–16 BUDGET: EFFECTIVELY IMPLEMENTING THE 2014 WATER BOND 3 (Feb.
11, 2015), http://www.lao.ca.gov/reports/2015/budget/water-bond/water-bond-021115.aspx
[https://perma.cc/GYT7-AFX2] (explaining that the State’s 2015-2016 budget implements 
a $7.5 billion water bond measure, and the budget proposes to appropriate $533 million 
from Proposition 1 in 2015–16).  To allocate more money for water management purposes,
perhaps similar Propositions for water bonds should be proposed and passed. See id. 
California would also likely need to manage the budget so as to take money from other programs 
that are less immediately important, such as transportation or corrections and rehabilitation
(although it is admittedly very difficult to choose an area that is less important or does not need
funding).  See id. Perhaps taxes must be raised in order to raise money for water management. 
See Howard Gleckman, One Solution to California’s Drought: Tax Water, FORBES (Apr.
7, 2015, 3:08 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/beltway/2015/04/07/one-solution-to-californias-
drought-tax-water/#3f54946d223e [https://perma.cc/9PFP-GA2D]. 
270. Current Conditions, CAL. DROUGHT, http://www.californiadrought.org/drought/ 
current-conditions/ [https://perma.cc/NR8Z-BUN7] (last visited Nov. 11, 2016) (depicting the 
status of California’s drought, current reservoir conditions, a fire map, and more through charts 
and graphs); see FIRMACION & RASKIN, supra note 6, at 51 (noting that the policy implications 
of California Water Code Sections 10520–10523 (West 1992) water resources are more 
effectively managed when land use is considered, which requires more oversight from water
management experts).  For an example of a microcosm of the increased governmental control
that must occur, see the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act, which increases local 
control over groundwater sources.  CAL. WATER CODE §§ 10750–10756 (West 2009). 
271. California Drought: Farm and Food Facts, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRICULTURE ECON 
RESEARCH SERV., http://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/in-the-news/california-drought-farm-and- 
food-impacts.aspx [https://perma.cc/66UV-B33E] (last updated Aug. 22, 2016) (“The ongoing
drought in California is likely to have a major impact on the State’s agricultural production.”);
Elizabeth Campbell & Megan Durisin, California Farms Going Thirsty as Drought Burns $5
Billion Hole, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 28, 2014, 5:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
articles/2014-01-29/california-farms-going-thirsty-as-drought-burns-5-billion-hole [https://
perma.cc/R32Z-TR47] (“The drought in California, the top U.S. agricultural producer at
$44.7 billion, is depriving the state of water needed to produce everything from milk, beef, 
and wine to some of the nation’s largest fruit and vegetable crops, including avocados, 
strawberries, and almonds.”).
272. Fixing California’s Water System, CAL. WATERFIX, www.californiawaterfix.com/ 
[https://perma.cc/FJF6-ZENL] (last visited Nov. 11, 2016) (“Without an update to our water
infrastructure, the environment and the state’s economy are at risk.  We face serious potential
1118
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Furthermore, this proposal should not necessarily be implemented
immediately. The 2015–2016 Governor’s Budget, for example, appropriates
funds from Proposition 1, passed in 2014, which will aid in water management
measures.273  Proposition 1 continues the use of bond funds as the primary 
source of state funding for water-related programs.274  The outcome of this
bond and others like it will likely be beneficial in analyzing when more 
bonds should be passed and for what amount. 
D. Legality, Counter Arguments, and Drawbacks 
The state is given control of water rights through the California Water 
Code, and it chooses when to appropriate rights.275  In fact, the State Water 
Board is the sole agency in charge of water rights, with the Division of 
Water Rights acting on its behalf on daily matters.276  Taking private water
rights under the public trust justification is legal, if the state can successfully 
argue that private property rights do not exist in waterways, because they
for disruption to our water supplies causing job loss, higher food and water prices, and
significant species decline.”).
273. TAYLOR, supra note 269 (explaining that the State’s 2015–16 budget implements a 
$7.5 billion water bond measure, and the budget proposes to appropriate $533 million from
Proposition 1 in 2015–16); see also Andrew Grinberg, The California Budget: Big Wins for Water, 
CLEAN WATER ACTION (June 26, 2015), http://www.cleanwater.org/2015/06/26/california-
budget-big-wins-water [https://perma.cc/V64S-J7J4] (describing budget programs, including
providing public access to existing groundwater data, and protecting water quality from the oil
industry). 
274. Water Quality, Supply, and Infrastructure Improvement Act of 2014, Cal. Stats. 
ch. 188 § 8 (West Supp. 2016); 2014 Water Bond, ASS’N OF CAL. WATER AGENCIES, http:// 
www.acwa.com/spotlight/2014-water-bond [https://perma.cc/2VCY-45RR] (last visited
Nov. 11, 2016) (“The $7.545 billion water bond approved overwhelmingly by California 
voters in November 2014 is expected to provide a significant infusion of funding for water
projects and programs at a pivotal time in California water.”); TAYLOR, supra note 269. 
275. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE § 1201 (West 2009) (“All water flowing in any natural 
channel, excepting so far as it has been . . . otherwise appropriated, is hereby declared to 
be public water . . . .”); see CAL. WATER CODE § 1253 (West 2009) (“The board shall allow 
the appropriation for beneficial purposes of unappropriated water . . . .”); see CAL. WATER
CODE § 1257 (West 2009) (“In acting upon applications to appropriate water, the board
shall consider the relative benefit to be deprived from (1) all beneficial uses of the water . . .
and (2) the reuse or reclamation of the water sought to be appropriated.”). 
276. Water Rights, supra note 27 (“Within the State Water Board, the Division of 
Water Rights acts on behalf of the State Water Board for day to day matters.”); About Us, 
supra note 242 (“Working with other agencies and the public, DWR develops strategic goals, 
and near-term and long-term actions to conserve, manage, develop, and sustain California’s 
watersheds, water resources, and management systems.”). 
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are the state’s property and within the public trust.277  The proposal is also 
legal under a theory of eminent domain if the state provides just compensation 
for the rights it takes.278  Finally, under a regulatory use justification, the 
state could again argue that no private property rights exist in waterways, 
and the state is only regulating the use of water, not the property right in
water.279  Furthermore, senior water rights are not absolutely guaranteed, 
and thus can legally be taken away.280  Of course, senior water rights holders 
will likely not approve of this plan, because they comprise the oldest water
rights-holding group in California.281 This dislike does not necessarily mean
that the plan is illegal, however, especially if the state’s authority is codified 
in the proposed constitutional amendment.  The state can also revoke permits 
if it so desires, as long as it provides the appropriator with notice and
opportunity for a hearing.282 The proposal enlarges state government power,
 277. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2; O’Dea, supra note 126, at 439; see Scott Andrew Shepard,
The Unbearable Cost of Skipping the Check: Property Rights, Takings Compensation &
Ecological Protection in the Western Water Law Context, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1063, 1067 
(2009) (“The federal public trust doctrine either is silent on the issue [of the compensation-
stripping proposition], or along with the Fifth Amendment, affirmatively obliges compensation
for vested water rights.”). 
278. U.S. CONST. amend. V; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19; Kelo v. City of New London, 
545 U.S. 469, 472, 477 (2005); Lee, supra note 214, at 594 (“The Supreme Court has 
elaborated . . . defining ‘just compensation’ as the taken property’s ‘fair market value,’ 
and in turn defining ‘fair market value’ as the price that would be agreed to by a willing 
seller and a willing buyer.” (citing Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934); 
United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943))); Lusvardi & Warren, supra note 214 
(noting that because water is free, there is no real fair market value of water, and instead
the cost of water comes from the cost to “capture, store, convey, and treat” water). 
279. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2; Saxer, supra note 220, at 53 (“While the majority of
state legislatures and state and federal courts continue to talk about water rights in property
terms, water rights are generally viewed not as actual property rights subject to a taking
under the Fifth Amendment, but as usufructuary rights, or a license from the state or federal
government that can be revoked and is governed by contract rights.”). 
280. Henderson, supra note 38, at 13 (noting that senior water rights are “generally
superior” but do not guarantee water, and while unpopular, senior water rights can be curtailed
to prevent unreasonable use of the state’s water supplies). 
281. Andy Alfaro, Modesto-Area Irrigation Districts Sue State Over Water Restrictions, 
MODESTO BEE (June 19, 2015, 7:26 PM), http://www.modbee.com/news/article25043410.html
[https://perma.cc/LW4H-HC29] (“Modesto-area irrigation districts are suing the State Water
Resources Control Board after the agency last week curtailed century-old water rights for 
some of them.”); Water Rights Process, supra note 22 (explaining that pre-1914 appropriators
established water rights in a “hierarchy of priorities,” and in times of water shortage, junior 
water right holders must discontinue water use before senior water right holders). 
282. CAL. WATER CODE § 1241 (West 2009) (“If the person entitled to the use of 
water fails to use beneficially all or any part of the water claimed by him or her . . . for
a period of five years, that unused water may revert to the public and shall, if reverted, be 
regarded as unappropriated public water.”); Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 224
(explaining that the State Water Board can modify permits and licenses to require more 
protective conditions, and “must provide the permit or license holder with notice and 
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which might be unpopular in localities, but enlarging state power is legal,
especially through constitutional amendment. 
One problem that may arise in using the public trust doctrine as a legal 
justification is the argument that the government has a public trust obligation 
to prevent the government from conveying a trust resource away from 
public ownership.283  The state can counter, of course, that the taking of water
rights is for the public good and in the public’s best interests, so it is therefore
justified.284  As mentioned, senior water rights holders will oppose the
proposal as well.285  Senior water rights holders hold their rights without
contest and with the highest priority, and some litigation has already resulted 
where senior water rights holders claim that their water rights have been
unjustly taken.286  However, the state’s authority will legally expand under
opportunity for a hearing before making changes”); see Water Rights Due Diligence, 
SCHROEDER LAW OFFICES, P.C., http://www.water-law.com/water-rights-articles/water-
rights-due-diligence/#IV [https://perma.cc/H4NT-FE5W] (last visited Nov. 11, 2016)
(“Although the Code provides that a right ceases upon failure to apply water to a useful or 
beneficial purpose, it appears that the right is not officially forfeited, and the water considered
available for appropriation, until the SWRCB issues a formal finding after notice to the 
permittee, and, if the permitee requests, a hearing.” (citing WATER § 1241)); see also Nevada
Water Law 101, NEVADA DEP’T OF CONSERVATION & NAT. RES., http://dcnr.nv.gov/documents/ 
documents/nevada-water-law-101/ [https://perma.cc/95LN-A8UB] (last visited Nov. 11, 2016)
(“[Appropriated] water rights can be lost by cancellation, forfeiture, or abandonment.”). 
283. Ryan, supra note 145, at 571 (“Illinois was able to successfully reestablish public
ownership of Chicago Harbor on the grounds that the public trust doctrine acted as a limit
on the state’s legal ability to casually convey trust lands.”); see Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois,
146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892) (“The control of the State for the purposes of the trust can never
be lost . . . .”). 
284. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 728 (Cal. 1983) (“In 
[approving appropriations despite foreseeable harm to public trust uses], however, the state 
must bear in mind its duty as trustee to consider the effect of the taking on the public trust, 
and to preserve, so far as consistent with the public interest, the uses protected by the 
trust.” (citation omitted)); O’Dea, supra note 126, at 449 (“To establish a successful public 
trust defense, the court stated that the federal government must make an adequate showing
that the interests protected by the public trust outweigh the public interest in the District’s
water project.” (citing Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 102 Fed. Cl. 443, 461 (2011))). 
285. See supra Part III (c)(iii); Boxall, supra note 32 (“The lawsuits hit the courts 
within days of the state mailing notices to some Central Valley irrigation districts: They were
to stop diverting from rivers and streams because there wasn’t enough water to go around.”). 
286. Jacobs, supra note 165 (“Environmental lawyers and some academics disagree 
[with a specialist who asserts that senior water rights are vested property rights] . . . . They
argue California is enforcing its water rules to address the extreme shortage.”); Water 
Rights Process, supra note 22 (“In times of shortage the most recent (‘junior’) right holder
must be the first to discontinue such use; each right’s priority dates to the time the permit 
application was filed with the State Board.”).
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the new proposed amended language to California’s constitution, and this 
authority will enable the state to take a major action for the betterment of 
California’s citizens and its water supply.  The state’s newly acquired authority 
will not be excessive, because it remains subject to the requirement that
the water be put to reasonable and beneficial uses.  Also, local water managers 
will be in direct contact with the state according to the language in the
proposed alteration of the constitutional amendment, and thus will be able 
to object if the state is not distributing water in reasonable or beneficial 
ways. 
There will also likely be economic drawbacks.  Land development will 
probably need to be postponed or halted until California’s severe water
problems subside.  This will likely limit the population influx and hurt 
the economy, because there will be less development.287  A decrease in
development will decrease the number of available jobs in California.288 
Also, there would be a smaller tax base to draw from as fewer people move
to California in the hopes of obtaining work, which would likely lead to 
fewer services such as hospitals and schools.
This proposal is still justifiable despite the lack of certain groups’ support,
because it is necessary for California to better distribute and manage water
resources. Further, new government jobs would be necessarily created in
California state agencies, which would offset the jobs cut by the decrease in 
land development.  Citizens would benefit overall, because with less water 
287. Chris Kirkham, California Economy is Projected to Grow Faster than U.S. Through 
2020, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2015, 5:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-california-
economy-growth-20150929-story.html (“Job gains next year will continue to be driven by
growth in construction, professional and technical services, and transportation and warehousing 
tied to international trade.”); JunJie Wu, Land Use Changes: Economic, Social, and 
Environmental Impacts, CHOICES MAG., 4th Quarter 2008, at 6, http://www.choicesmagazine.
org/UserFiles/file/article_49.pdf [https://perma.cc/SJ7U-5J7V] (“Land is one of three major 
factors of production in classical economics (along with labor and capital) and an essential 
input for housing and food production.”); id. (“Land use change is necessary and essential
for economic development and social progress.”). 
288. Wu, supra note 287 (noting that socioeconomic impacts of land-use changes 
“hinder the function of market forces”); id. (“Land use regulations that aim at curbing land
development will raise housing prices, making housing less affordable to middle—and low—
income households.”); id. (“Land use regulation must strike a balance between private property
rights and the public interest.”); see Marc Lifsher, California Tops Other States in Job Growth, 
L.A. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2015, 9:04 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-capitol-business-
beat-20150323-story.html [https://perma.cc/PN3U-Q8AN] (“Tourism, international trade, 
development of a regional tech sector and an uptick in construction contributed to the Southern 
California boomlet.”); New Americans in California, AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL (Jan.
1, 2015), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/new-americans-california
[https://perma.cc/XDW7-SUR7] (“Immigrants comprised 33.9% of the state’s workforce in
2013 (or 6.5 million workers) according to the U.S. Census Bureau.”); id. (“Immigrants
comprise more than one third of the California labor force.”); id. (“[Immigrants] figure 
prominently in key economic sectors such as agriculture, manufacturing and services.”).
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going to unsustainable land developments, water would be more available 
at a lower cost to both existing municipalities and agricultural areas. 
V. CONCLUSION
Lawmakers and the courts alike must continue to take California’s drought
seriously.  With amended language in California’s Constitution enabling 
the state to revoke all private water rights—including but not limited to taking 
senior water rights, taking riparian rights, and revoking appropriators’
permits—and create a new standard form general plan that localities must
abide by with more stringent requirements, the state will gain direct control
over water management and land development.  While this proposal may
be unique in the amount of authority delegated to the state legislature from 
localities and individuals, it could not come at a better time and should be 
embraced by Californians.  With more funding for the State Water Board and
the variety of legal justifications—the public trust doctrine, the theory of
eminent domain, and the regulatory use argument—to endorse the state’s 
actions, the state will be well equipped to finally tackle California’s water 
shortage problem that manifests in impractical land development. The 
persistent drought requires drastic legal action to find a solution, because
the drought has no clear end in sight.289  Only after water rights are taken 
back and land development is curtailed and managed can the state resume
a more sustainable condition in a never-ending state of drought.
 289. Kurtis Alexander, How Much El Niño Rain Needed to End Drought? More Than 1
Answer, S.F. CHRON. (Jan. 13, 2016), http://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/article/How-
much-El-Ni-o-rain-needed-to-end-drought-6754540.php [https://perma.cc/H7YX-R672]
(discussing that a board member from the Lompico water district, where strict water quotas 
remain due to the drought, stated it would take the district years to recover, even with future
steady rain); id. (“California’s diverse water supplies, varying weather and fluctuating demand
mean there won’t be a single point when the state’s water problems come to an end.”); Alan
Neuhauser, El Niño May Ease California Drought, but Not End It, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. 
(Oct. 15, 2015, 1:50 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/10/15/el-nino-may-
ease-california-drought-but-not-end-it-noaa-says [https://perma.cc/9MAL-6GBR] (noting
that Mike Halpert, deputy director of NOAA’s Climate Prediction Center, stated, “While it 
is good news that drought improvement is predicted for California, one season of above-average 
rain and snow is unlikely to remove four years of drought.”).
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